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FURMAN'S MYTHICAL MANDATE
Scott W. Howe*
This Article argues for the rescue and reform of Supreme Court doctrine regulating
capital sentencing trials under the Eighth Amendment. Many legal commentators,
both liberal and conservative, including several members of the Supreme Court,
have concluded that the Court's regulation of capital sentencing trials is a disas-
ter. The repeated criticisms rest on a commonly accepted view about a principal
goal of capital sentencing regulation. The prevailing account, fueled by the rheto-
ric of the Justices, stems from the notion that Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 208
(1972), revealed a mandate of consistency in the use of the death penalty that the
Court has struggled to fulfill. However, this Article shows that consistency is im-
plausible as an Eighth Amendment aspiration and that the Court has never
seriously pursued consistency after Furman. The Court has focused almost en-
tirely on promoting expansive individualized consideration of capital offenders, a
goal at odds with consistency. The problem is that the Court's continuing rhetori-
cal commitment to Furman's mythical mandate has cast doubt on the value and
legitimacy of individualization and has diverted attention from efforts to clarify
why individualization serves Eighth Amendment ends. In defense of the doctrine,
the Article provides an Eighth Amendment theory for individualization--one
founded on avoiding retributive excess. The Article also shows, however, that this
theory calls for reforms that could further assure that only the deserving receive the
death penalty.
Since Furman v. Georgia' prohibited standardless capital sentenc-
ing, the Supreme Court has regulated capital sentencing primarily
under the Eighth Amendment. According to the Court, a principal
aim of this regulation is to reduce arbitrariness or inconsistency in
the use of the death penalty.2 Before Furman, no satisfactory
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1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. The Court has declared that the purpose of the doctrine is to make the process for
imposing death "rationally reviewable," see, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990)
(quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion)), and to ensure
that the sentencer is guided by "clear and objective standards," see, e.g., Godfrey, 446 U.S. at
428 (plurality opinion) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion)), with the ultimate goal of regularizing the decision of whether to impose death, see
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion) (asserting that
Furman required states to replace "arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objective stan-
dards" to, among other things, "regularize" the sentencing process); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 222
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explanation could rationalize the selection of a few hundred peo-
ple for execution from among the many thousands who had
committed capital crimes each year.3 Consequently, in the three
decades after Furman, the Court has devoted great efforts to articu-
lating and refining doctrines that purport to ensure that death-
selection systems provide "a meaningful basis for distinguishing the
few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not."4
While consistency may sound preferable to arbitrariness in capi-
tal selection, this asserted goal of the Court's regulation poses
problems. First, a consistency mandate does not comport with the
language of the Eighth Amendment. 5 The prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishments implies substantive limits on decisional
standards rather than merely a requirement of regularity.6 At the
same time, the clause seems only to forbid the imposition of the
death penalty where it is unwarranted,7 unlike a consistency man-
(White,J., concurring) (asserting that Furman required a death sentencing scheme to "result
in death sentences being imposed with reasonable consistency").
3. See, e.g., ArthurJ. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Uncon-
stitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1791-92 (1970) (noting that only a small percentage of
the thousands of persons who were convicted of capital crimes were sentenced to death and
asserting that "[m]ost commentators describe the imposition of the death penalty as not
only haphazard and capricious, but also discriminatory").
4. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 427 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S.
at 313 (White,J., concurring))). See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 301 (1987) (quot-
ing Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (WhiteJ., concurring)).
5. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
6. To require a state to act consistently or nonarbitrarily is to allow the state to specify
even a draconian decisional standard as long as it follows that standard. Cf Peter Westen,
TheEmpty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 543-48 (1982) (contending that equality is a
vacuous concept because its meaning relies on the importation of some external substantive
standard).
The important Eighth Amendment question that the consistency or nonarbitrariness goal
ignores is this: what substantive standard defines for a capital sentencer, or for a reviewing
court, when a death sentence is acceptable? See Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth
Amendment Regulation of the Capital Sentencing Tria 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 861 (1998)
("Unless a substantive Eighth Amendment standard exists by which to distinguish among
capital offenders ... one cannot complain on consistency grounds about the offenders'
uniformly harsh treatment.").
7. Many believe that arbitrariness in the distribution of punishment does not render
a deserved punishment unjust. See, e.g., Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A
Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1663 (1986) ("Maldistribution of any punishment among
those who deserve it is irrelevant to its justice or morality."). Absent intentional discrimina-
tion, this view ofjustice may survive even in the face of racial disparities as long as those who
received the death penalty actually deserved that punishment. See, e.g., Louis MICHAEL
SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF 160 (1996) (asking "[i]f Allen [an
African American] really deserves to die, why should he be spared simply because Bob [a
white man] has wrongly beaten the system?"); Rory K. Little, Mhat Federal Prosecutors Really
Think: The Puzzle of Statistical Race Disparity Versus Specific Guilt, and the Specter of Timothy
McVeigh, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 1591, 1614 (2004) ("[G]eneralized race disparity alone cannot
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date which would also forbid unwarranted reprieves.' Second, the
Court's capital sentencing doctrine does not appear designed to
achieve consistency. The Court has mandated expansive individual-
ized consideration-requiring that capital sentencers remain free
to reject the death penalty based on any evidence proffered con-
cerning the offender's character, record, or crime9-which seems
to thwart rather than to promote consistency. Finally, capital selec-
tion remains arbitrary in fact.' Many studies suggest that racial
biases continue to influence outcomes."
logically require dismissal of deserving capital prosecutions in the minds of prosecutors who
have carefully determined the facts and fairness of their individual cases."). See also RANDALL
COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 198 (2d ed.
2001) (noting that death penalty supporters argue that society's interest in retribution
trumps equal protection concerns); Richard 0. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment
of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1177, 1178-79 (1981)
(noting that retributivists argue "that inequitable application is not inherent in the penalty,
and that it is better that some receive theirjust deserts, however biased the sample executed,
than that none do"). Nonetheless, the important question is whether evidence of racial
disparities casts doubt on our ability to appropriately determine the deserts of murderers.
For more on why this kind of claim should raise Eighth Amendment concerns about the use
of the death penalty, see infra Part III.B.2.
8. See Howe, supra note 6, at 824 ("If the Eighth Amendment required consistency, a
system involving unrelenting harshness in the imposition of death sentences should suc-
ceed, while a system giving officials discretion to extend merciful reprieves should fail.");
Daniel P. Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 27
(asserting that an Eighth Amendment mandate of consistency in capital sentencing involves
a "profound contradiction," because it means that "a punishment imposed under a system
of unmitigated harshness would be less cruel" than one allowing merciful reprieves).
Consistency or nonarbitrariness appears impossible to achieve unless, illogically, the
group within which the measure is to be taken consists only of those convicted of a capital
crime. It is not apparent how to achieve consistency among those merely charged with or
factually chargeable with a capital offense. See infra text accompanying notes 28-29. Yet, it is
also not apparent why consistency within the convicted group should matter except as part
of an effort to achieve consistency within the larger selection process.
9. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion) (rejecting a
statute mandating the death penalty based on negative answers to three narrow sentencing
questions); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) (reject-
ing a statute mandating the death penalty upon conviction).
10. See, e.g.,Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punishment, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 1670, 1675 (1986) ("We have a system of capital punishment that results in infre-
quent, random, and erratic executions, one that is structured to inflict death neither on
those who have committed the worst offenses nor on defendants of the worst character.");
Carol S. Steiker &Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Consti-
tutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REv. 357, 438 (1995) ("We are left with
the worst of all possible worlds: the Supreme Court's detailed attention to death penalty law
has generated negligible improvements over the pre-Furman era, but has helped people to
accept without second thoughts-much less 'sober' ones-our profoundly failed system of
capital punishment.").
11. See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and
the Eighth Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2083, 2106-23 (2004) (discussing various studies); RonaldJ. Tabak, Is Ra-
cism Irrelevant? Or Should the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act Be Enacted To Substantially Diminish
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Despite these problems, not only the Justices but commentators
as well have often asserted that consistency is a principal goal of
the Court's capital sentencing regulation. 2 The prevailing ap-
proach to analyzing the doctrine accepts consistency as a principal
aim and focuses on whether the Court has achieved that goal and,
in some cases, on whether better strategies exist to achieve it.1
3
Scholars generally conclude that the Court started out after
Furman by genuinely pursuing consistency, but that it later re-
treated.1 4 They acknowledge that the Court rendered numerous
decisions in the 1980s that cast doubt on the level of its commit-
ment to consistency. 5 Nonetheless, commentators have generally
RacialDiscrimination in Capital Sentencing, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 777, 778 (1990--
91).
12. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 26
(1990) [hereinafter BALDUS STUDY] (asserting that the post-Furman decisions sought to
"vindicate the core concerns" of Furman by requiring that systems be capable of "producing
rational, evenhanded sentences while ensuring that each defendant receives a factually reli-
able, individualized sentencing determination"); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and
Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6
WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 345, 458 (1998) ("The modern era of the Court's evaluation of the
constitutionality of the death penalty began with a simple principle: While treating all de-
fendants equally, sentencers should fully and fairly consider each defendant and the crime
committed before deciding whether to execute or to imprison."); Steiker & Steiker, supra
note 10, at 378. See also Stephen P. Garvey, Death-Innocence and the Law of Habeas Corpus, 56
ALB. L. REv. 225, 228 (1992); Janet C. Hoeffel, Risking the Eighth Amendment: Arbitrariness,
Juries, and Discretion in Capital Cases, 46 B.C. L. REv. 771, 786 (2005); Steven Semeraro, Re-
sponsibility in Capital Sentencing, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 83 (2002).
13. See, e.g., BALDUS STUDY, supra note 12, at 26-27 ("If, in fact, [our] study concluded
that the Georgia statute has failed to produce rational, consistent sentencing results, such a
finding would threaten the central premise of the Court's conclusion ... that the [post-
Furman] Georgia statute was constitutional."); LINDA E. CARTER & ELLEN KREITZBERG, UN-
DERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAw 181 (noting that, according to the prevailing view,
"the critical question is whether the results of the death penalty system ... are arbitrary and
capricious"); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 414-26 (discussing "means other than con-
trolling sentencer discretion at the moment of decision" to promote "'equality' in the
administration of the death penalty").
14. See, e.g., BALDUS STUDY, supra note 12, at 394; WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY IN THE NINETIES 8, 11 (1991) (asserting that, in 1983, the Court took a new interest in
"promoting expeditious executions"); Louis D. Bilionis, Legitimating Death, 91 MICH. L. REv.
1643, 1658 (1993) (noting that the Court's decisions in the early 1980s reflected the "de-
regulation" of capital punishment); Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty
and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1782 (1987); William S. Geimer, Death at Any
Cost: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat from Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 737, 759-60 (1985); Raymond J. Pascucci et al., Special Project: Capital Punishment
in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1138
(1984); Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SuP. CT. REv. 305, 305; Richard E. Wirick,
Comment, Dark Year on Death Row: Guiding Sentencer Discretion After Zant, Barclay & Harris, 17
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 689, 729 (1984).
15. The most transparent example is McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), in which
the Court upheld Georgia's capital sentencing system despite statistical evidence from a
sophisticated study indicating that race influenced outcomes. See infra notes 86-88 and ac-
companying text.
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not questioned whether consistency is a legitimate Eighth
Amendment aspiration.
This Article rejects consistency as a rationale for capital sentenc-
ing doctrine. The Article demonstrates that the Supreme Court
was never seriously committed to consistency after Furman. Instead,
the Court has always focused on the goal of individualized consid-
eration. In light of the Court's work, the Article urges an Eighth
Amendment theory for individualization and an evaluation of the
doctrine under that theory.
Recognition that the earliest post-Furman decisions actually re-
jected the consistency mandate and that the Court has never
seriously pursued that goal would eliminate a major distraction
from the important questions to be asked about the purpose and
legitimacy of the doctrine. Scholars and the Justices themselves
have often touted the notion that the doctrine reflects a problem-
atic tension between the goal of consistency and the requirement
of individualized consideration. Some have suggested that the
Court faces an ongoing struggle to accommodate those competing
aims.' 6 Others have contended that the goals are irreconcilable,
thereby justifying abolition of the death penalty'7 or, in the view of
two Justices, the evisceration of the individualization requirement."'
Commentators have disagreed about when the Court began backing away from the goal
of consistency. Most have concluded that the crucial turn came in the 1980s, but some have
noted the emergence of a tension as early as 1976, see, e.g., Vivian Berger, "Black Box Deci-
sions" on Life or Death-If They're Arbitrary, Don't Blame the Jury: A Reply to Judge Patrick
Higginbotham, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1067, 1079-80 (1991) (asserting that "Gregg pur-
ported to solve the problem of arbitrariness and inequality exposed in Furman" while
"simultaneously, Woodson enshrined the primacy of individualization"), or with the decision
in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), see, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconcil-
ing Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. Rav. 1147,
1206 (1991).
16. See, e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting "the tension that has long existed between the two central principles of our Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence"); Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas
Reform, 83 CAL. L. Rav. 485, 520 (1995) (noting an "inherent tension" in the Court's capital
sentencing jurisprudence and discussing the Court's continuing efforts to confront it).
17. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1149, 1157 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (asserting that the inability to satisfy both commands warrants
abolition); Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. Rav. 67, 103 (1992)
("The Court's two objectives are not, as Justice Scalia argues, irreconcilable with each other.
Rather, they are irreconcilable with the death penalty."). See also Carol S. Steiker &Jordan M.
Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing,
102 YALE L.J. 835, 868 (1992) (book review).
18. See, e.g., Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 293-94 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(contending that the conflict requires evisceration of the individualization mandate);
Callins, 510 U.S. at 1141-42 (Scalia,J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (arguing that the
inability to fulfill both commands warrants rejection of the individualization mandate);
Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 487-88 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing "dis-
agreement with the Court's prohibition" of "mandatory sentencing provision[s]"). See also
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Yet, none of these arguments are sensible because the Court's deci-
sions embody no such conflict. Except in its rhetoric, the Court
repudiated consistency as a regulatory goal-and justifiably so-
when it first reconsidered capital punishment after Furman in the
1976 Cases.l"
The Article also explains how regulation centered on promoting
individualized consideration serves Eighth Amendment ends. The
explanation builds on a deserts-limitation-only those who deserve
the death penalty should receive that sanction.2 ° This principle
comports with the language of the Eighth Amendment and, if un-
derstood as a basis for mediating between deregulation and
abolition, can both justify and improve capital sentencing doctrine.
This Article proceeds in three stages. Part I demonstrates that
the Court's early post-Furman decisions, which explicated the prin-
ciples that still govern capital sentencing today, resulted from goals
other than consistency. Principally, the decisions ensured individu-
alized capital sentencing. Nonetheless, as Part II demonstrates, the
Justices and commentators have often continued to assert that
Furman commands consistency, which has spurred a false notion
that the doctrine embodies a problematic tension between consis-
tency and individualized consideration. Rejecting the consistency
rationale resolves the various claims that this purported conflict
has spawned, but leaves unanswered the question whether existing
doctrine has constitutional legitimacy. Part III concludes that the
Court's central focus on individualized consideration finds expla-
nation in the Eighth Amendment prohibition against retributive
excess. Although existing doctrine largely coincides with this
Eighth Amendment limitation, this Part also notes reforms that
could further assure that only the deserving receive the death pen-
alty.
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 382 ("T]woJustices have sought to resolve the dilemma
by abandoning the individualization requirement.").
19. The Court decided five cases on July 2, 1976. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976) (upholding the Georgia capital sentencing system); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976) (upholding the Florida scheme);Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding the
Texas statute); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (rejecting the North Caro-
lina statute); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (rejecting the Louisiana system).
20. See generally Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sentencing Cases: A De-
sert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 323, 418-19 (1992) ("The Eighth
Amendment limits the use of the death penalty to those who deserve it, and the need to
assess deserts individually explains the need for a capital sentencing inquiry.").
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I. MODERN CAPITAL SENTENCING DOCTRINE
The effective interpretation of the Court's modern jurispru-
dence rests on properly understanding the relationship between
Furman and the early decisions on capital sentencing. The prevail-
ing view suggests that Furman articulated an Eighth Amendment
vision of equal treatment of capital offenders and that the early
decisions after Furman vigorously pursued that vision.2 ' The Court
itself has looked back at the 1976 Cases as being congruous with
Furman,2 and consistency remains a touted aspiration of the
Court's regulatory efforts.2s Nonetheless, this Part presents a differ-
ent perspective. It contends that the post-Furman Court was always
focused on the goal of individualized consideration and was never
seriously committed to consistency.
A. Furman and Consistency
Despite the consensus that subsequently developed about the
meaning of Furman, its immediate message for the future of capital
punishment was indecipherable. The five Justices who supported
the per curiam order striking down death sentences under the
Eighth Amendment2 4 all wrote separate opinions in which no other
Justice joined. Brennan and Marshall advocated abolition.' Doug-
las, Stewart, and White purported only to oppose the death penalty
as then administered.26 These latter three Justices denounced as
unacceptably biased or, at least, haphazard the results produced by
then-existing systems, and focused their opposition especially on
21. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
22. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 364.
23. Consistency remains a cited goal although most commentators agree that the
Court tempered its pursuit of consistency in the 1980s. Regarding the continuing tendency
among the Justices to cite consistency as an important goal, see infra Part II. Regarding the
tendency among commentators to accept this aspiration as legitimate, despite the percep-
tion of a waning commitment by the Justices in the 1980s, see supra notes 12-15 and
accompanying text.
24. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam).
25. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The punishment of death is ... 'cruel and
unusual"'); id. at 371 (Marshall,J., concurring) (concluding that the death penalty was not
consistent with contemporary community values and, therefore, violated the Eighth
Amendment).
26. Douglas asserted that discretionary capital sentencing was "pregnant with dis-
crimination" against minorities and the poor. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring). Stewart
concluded that standardless sentencing produced "capricious[]" and "random" results. Id. at
309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). White found that the death penalty was imposed inconsis-
tently and with "great infrequency." Id. at 313 (White,J, concurring).
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the prevailing practice of standardless capital sentencing. 7 Yet,
none of them clarified what approach might satisfy the Eighth
Amendment, which left legislators in the dark about whether or
how they could successfully restructure their capital selection sys-
tems.
Some commentators thought that Furman signaled the end of
the death penalty.2" If the majority of the Court was to require con-
sistency in the overall capital selection process, the standard
appeared impossible to achieve. Neither sentencing hearings with
standards nor even mandatory death penalties would prevent arbi-
trary reprieves by prosecutors and juries at the pre-sentencing
stages. Indeed, it was unclear how a state could control discretion
at those phases. Nor was it clear why the Court would care about
consistency at the sentencing stage except as a way of promoting
consistency in the overall selection process.2 9
The view also persisted, however, that five Justices might accept
something less than consistency in the larger process. Although
McGautha v. California had suggested only a year before Furman
that generalized capital sentencing criteria would be useless, °
some believed that the Court might interpret Furman narrowly to
require only very basic sentencing standards.3 1 The view was wide-
spread that five Justices might also accept mandatory death
statutes, which at least would ensure consistent treatment at sen-
tencing. 32 The Court's failure to strike down the death penalty
27. Concerns about racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty
animated the litigation leading up to Furman and surely influenced these Justices. See, e.g.,
Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 479 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Furman v. Georgia
was decided in an atmosphere suffused with concern about race bias in the administration
of the death penalty.. ").
28. See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT xiii (1977); MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 291 (1973) (noting that,
shortly after the Furman decision, Jack Greenberg, then head of the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, issued a public statement asserting: "there will no longer be any more capital punish-
ment in the United States"); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 51 (1986).
29. See, e.g., Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87
HARV. L. REv. 1690, 1691 (1974) (noting that consistency might be required not only at the
sentencing stage but in the larger capital selection process).
30. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208 (1971) ("The infinite variety of cases
and facets to each case would make general standards either meaningless 'boiler-plate' or a
statement of the obvious that no jury would need.").
31. See, e.g., Note, The Death Penalty-The Alternatives Left After Furman v. Georgia, 37
ALB. L. REv. 344, 362-63 (1973) (asserting that capital sentencing systems based on a Model
Penal Code proposal, which was the basic approach ultimately adopted in such states as
Georgia and Florida, might pass constitutional muster).
32. See, e.g., John W. Poulos, The Supneme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive
Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARIz. L. REv. 143, 235
(1986) (noting that twenty-two state legislatures enacted mandatory death penalty statutes
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altogether in Furman left open the possibility that some kind of
capital sentencing scheme could satisfy the Justices.
The outpouring of public and legislative support for the death
penalty shortly after Furman also allayed any notion that the sanc-
tion had lost its general acceptance. Many public officials
denounced the Court in the days after Furman.33 Some called for
requiring federal judges to sit for election 34 and others for a consti-
tutional amendment permitting the death penalty.3' Within four
years, thirty-five states enacted new death penalty legislation.36 The
majority of these states opted for a mandatory death penalty, al-
though they defined the predicate capital offense in varying
terms.37 The remainder chose to provide sentencing hearings with
standards.3s These cumulative results, while demonstrating legisla-
tive uncertainty as to what Furman mandated, made clear that the
death penalty remained enormously popular.
B. The 1976 Cases: Rejecting Consistency
When the Court returned to the question of capital punishment
in the 1976 Cases, its decisions rejected consistency as a goal while
its rhetoric claimed the contrary. A crucial plurality struck down
statutes that seemed at least to promote consistency in the sentenc-
ing phase while upholding others that did little even to advance
that goal. The plurality retreated from Furman's apparent com-
mand of consistency by refraining to abolish capital punishment,
but used that same command to justify ongoing regulation and, in
particular, to reject the mandatory statutes that Furman had en-
couraged.39
shortly after Furman on the conclusion that "mandatory capital punishment would pass con-
stitutional muster").
33. See MELTSNER, supra note 28, at 290-91 (detailing comments of public officials,
some praising, but many deriding the decision).
34. See id. at 291 ("Georgia State Representative Sam Nunn, Jr., a candidate for the
United States Senate, announced that the decision justified forcing federal judges to face
the voters every six years.").
35. See id. ("By the time the evening papers were out, a few congressmen had proposed
an amendment to the Constitution in order to permit the death penalty.").
36. See, e.g., Poulos, supra note 32, at 226, 238 tbl. 1.
37. See id. at 227, 238 tbl. I (indicating that twenty-two of the thirty-five states enacted
statutes providing for a mandatory death penalty).
38. For a review of the different standards employed, see Note, supra note 29, at 1699-
1709 (summarizing the new statutes and explaining the standards they imposed).
39. The composition of the Court changed slightly between 1972 and 1976. Justice
Stevens, who voted with the crucial plurality in the 1976 Cases, replaced Justice Douglas, who
had voted to strike down the death statutes in Furman. See Poulos, supra note 32, at 228.
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In the 1976 Cases, the Court considered together the propriety
of the new statutes passed in North Carolina, Louisiana, Texas,
Florida, and Georgia. North Carolina's statute was the most severe,
subjecting anyone convicted of a broadly defined category of mur-
der to a mandatory death penalty.0 The statute from Louisiana
narrowed the capital offense to more aggravated categories, but
also made the death penalty mandatory upon conviction.41 Texas's
statute was in the middle, narrowing the definition of a capital
crime to certain aggravated murders and providing a limited sen-
tencing inquiry. 2 The capital sentencer was presented with three
"special questions," and, unless the answer to one of the questions
was negative, the offender received the death penalty. 3 Florida and
Georgia enacted discretionary sentencing statutes that provided for
a separate sentencing hearing at which the sentencer retained
great discretion." To impose a death sentence, the sentencer was
required to find the presence of at least one aggravating factor
from a statutory list and thereafter to consider additional aggravat-
ing evidence offered by the prosecution and any mitigating
evidence offered by the defense.45
In assessing the five statutes under the Eighth Amendment, the
Justices faced four basic options:
1. Strike down all five statutes;
2. Uphold all five statutes;
40. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
41. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (1974).
42. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.0711 (Vernon 1975).
43. The statute required the sentencing jury or judge to answer the first two questions
and also the third in any case where there was evidence of victim provocation:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the de-
ceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation
that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit crimi-
nal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society;
and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in kill-
ing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if
any, by the deceased.
Id. § 3(b)(1)-(3).
44. SeeFLA. STAT. § 921.141 (Supp. 1976-77); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-25-03 (1972).
45. The two systems differed in some ways, such as whether the sentencer could con-
sider nonstatutory aggravators, with Georgia allowing such consideration but Florida, at least
originally, seeming not to allow it. See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 14, at 354. But see infra text
accompanying note 85 (discussing decision of the Florida Supreme Court finding harmless
error in the consideration of nonstatutory aggravating evidence). Also, in Florida, the jury
recommended a sentence but the judge could override a jury recommendation, while, in
Georgia, the jury's decision was controlling. SeeWeisberg, supra note 14, at 354.
[VOL. 40:3
Furman Mythical Mandate
3. Uphold the mandatory statutes while striking down
the discretionary statutes; or
4. Uphold the discretionary statutes while striking
down the mandatory statutes.
In the end, the Court was badly divided among these choices. A
splintered group of four Justices-Burger, White, Rehnquist, and
Blackmun-voted to uphold all five statutes.46 Two Justices-
Brennan and Marshall-adhered to their views in Furman that the
death penalty was altogether unconstitutional. A plurality of three
Justices-Stewart, Powell, and Stevens-chose option four. The
plurality upheld the discretionary sentencing statutes of Georgia
and Florida and also upheld the special-question statute from
Texas.48 However, the plurality struck down the mandatory death
penalty laws in North Carolina and Louisiana. 9
The significance of the 1976 Cases was revealed in the outcomes
more than by what any of the Justices said about them. The plural-
ity claimed to pursue Furman's command of consistency.5° However,
the outcomes demonstrated that the plurality had no serious inter-
est in that goal. If the plurality had wanted to pursue consistency, it
would have chosen option three or option one. The approach that
would produce consistency, at least among convicted capital of-
fenders, was option three-upholding only the mandatory strategy
adopted in North Carolina and Louisiana. Of course, if the group
within which consistency was required included all who were
46. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist concurred in the Georgia,
Florida, and Texas cases in which the death penalties were upheld. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (White, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976) (White, J., concurring, joined by Burger, CJ.,
and Rehnquist, J.);Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 277 (1976) (White,J., concurring, joined by
Burger, CJ., and Rehnquist,J.). They dissented in the North Carolina and Louisiana cases in
which the death penalties were overturned. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
306 (1976) (White,J., dissenting, joined by Burger, CJ., and Rehnquist, J.); Roberts v. Lou-
isiana, 428 U.S.325, 337 (1976) (White,J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist,
J.). Justice Blackmun separately concurred in the Georgia, Florida, and Texas cases. See
Greg, 428 U.S. at 227 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 261 (Blackmun, J.,
concurning);Jurek, 428 U.S. at 279 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). He separately dissented in the
North Carolina and Louisiana cases. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 307 (Blackmun,J., dissenting);
Roberts, 428 U.S. at 363 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
47. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 232 (Marshall,J., dis-
senting).
48. See id., 428 U.S. at 158 (plurality opinion); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 244 (plurality opin-
ion);Jurek, 428 U.S. at 264 (plurality opinion).
49. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336 (plurality
opinion).
50. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (plurality opinion) ("On their face these procedures
seem to satisfy the concerns of Furman. No longer should there be 'no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not.'" (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White,J., concurring))).
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merely chargeable or charged with a capital offense, the manda-
tory statutes might not be any better (but certainly no worse) than
the discretionary statutes because both approaches would allow
arbitrary reprieves at stages other than capital sentencing. How-
ever, on that view, the best choice for upholding a commitment to
consistency was option one-striking down all of the statutes. Re-
gardless of how the Court defined the group within which to
measure consistency, the Justices could not easily have viewed the
discretionary statutes as promoting consistency and thus could not
plausibly have chosen option two. Even more clearly, the least sen-
sible choice for pursuing consistency was option four-upholding
the discretionary statutes while striking down the mandatory stat-
utes. Nonetheless, the plurality chose that least plausible option.
A cursory review of the Georgia sentencing statute, which the
plurality upheld in Gregg v. Georgia,5 revealed that it did almost
nothing to ensure consistency. The statute provided an extensive
list of aggravating factors, at least one of which the sentencing jury
had to find as a prerequisite to a death sentence.2 The list seemed
51. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
52. The statutory aggravating circumstances in the post-Furman Georgia statute were as
follows:
(1) The offense ... was committed by a person with a prior record of con-
viction for a capital felony, or the offense ... was committed by a
person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal con-
victions.
(2) The offense ... was committed while the offender was engaged in the
commission of another capital felony or aggravated battery, or the of-
fense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the
commission of burglary or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder,... knowingly created a great risk of
death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon
or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than
one person.
(4) The offender committed the offense ... for himself or another, for the
purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of ajudicial officer, formerjudicial officer, district attorney
or solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor [was committed] dur-
ing or because of the exercise of his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or com-
mitted murder as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense ... was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman
in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery
to the victim.
(8) The offense ... was committed against any peace officer, corrections
employee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official
duties.
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to cover almost all murders rather than reducing death eligibility
to a tiny class of the worst homicides.13 After identifying one of the
aggravating circumstances, the jury would decide whether to im-
pose the death penalty based on all of the aggravating and
mitigating evidence presented by both parties.54 The statute pro-
vided no governing standard for the decision, allowing the jury to
act as it wished, just as in the pre-Furman era. 5 While the plurality
at times described the function of the aggravating circumstances as
channeling or guiding the sentencer's discretion, 6 these charac-
terizations were wishful thinking at best.57 The finding of an
aggravating circumstance had no clear effect other than to slightly
narrow the group of people subject to the jury's untrammeled dis-
cretion.5 8 The plurality's decision to uphold this scheme rendered
(9) The offense ... was committed by a person in, or who has escaped
from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confine-
ment.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering
with or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful con-
finement, of himself or another.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1975) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (2004))
(quoted in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165-66 n.9).
53. See, e.g., BALDUS STUDY, supra note 12, at 102 ("[M]ore than 90 percent of the pre-
Furman death sentences were imposed in cases whose facts would have made them death-
eligible under Georgia's post-Furman statute.").
54. The plurality noted that the jury was not confined to considering aggravating fac-
tors that were on the statutory list. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 ("In addition, the jury is authorized
to consider any other appropriate aggravating or mitigating circumstances.").
55. When Furman was decided, almost every death penalty jurisdiction in the country
"afforded sentencers absolute discretion to impose either death or life imprisonment (or
sometimes merely a term of years) for certain crimes." Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at
364. Some jurisdictions, such as Ohio, conducted a combined guilt-or-innocence and sen-
tencing trial, while others, such as California, separated the two decisions. See McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 185-95 (1971) (discussing the conduct of two capital trials, one
from California and one from Ohio). Nonetheless, "unfettered discretion remained the
American way of imposing the death penalty." Poulos, supra note 32, at 159. For a short
summary of the pre-Furman history of capital sentencing procedure in the United States,
see id. at 146-72.
56. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 ("No longer can a Georgia jury do as Furman's jury
did: reach a finding of the defendant's guilt and then, without guidance or direction, decide
whether he should live or die.").
57. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 15, at 1073 ("But the Georgia system upheld in Gregg
channeled the jury's discretion minimally-mandating only that jurors ... find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, a single statutory aggravating circumstance.").
58. At one point, the plurality acknowledged the more limited "narrowing" function.
After noting that Georgia had not, in the wake of Furman, refined its definition of murder to
provide for a more limited crime of capital murder, the plurality asserted: "Georgia did act,
however, to narrow the class of murderers subject to capital punishment by specifying 10
statutory aggravating circumstances, one of which must be found by the jury to exist beyond
a reasonable doubt before a death sentence can ever be imposed." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-97.
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dead on arrival its simultaneous claim that Furman had com-
manded consistency.59
The plurality's opinions striking down the mandatory statutes
only underscored its lack of concern for consistency. In Woodson v.
North Carolina, Justice Stewart offered three reasons for requiring
individualized consideration and, thus, forbidding mandatory
death penalties.6 First, the mandatory approach conflicted with
the trend toward discretionary capital sentencing that had begun
in the 1830s.f1 This point had nothing to do with whether the
mandatory statutes promoted consistency; it merely implied that
consistency could not be achieved through unacceptable methods.
Second, Justice Stewart asserted that the mandatory statutes only
shifted the potential for arbitrary action to the guilt-or-innocence
trial.62 This point ignored that, assuming the concern was arbitrari-
ness in the overall selection process,63 the discretionary statutes also
did nothing to prevent arbitrary action at non-sentencing stages
and, worse, continued to allow for arbitrary action at the sentenc-
ing phase.6 Finally, he contended that a mandatory statute
59. The plurality noted that the statute also called for the Georgia Supreme Court to
conduct an appellate review to ensure that a death sentence did not appear disproportion-
ate to the sentences imposed in similar cases. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199. However, the plurality
could not reasonably have placed significant weight on this feature of the system. It was clear
that the Georgia Supreme Court could not ensure consistency among those charged with
capital crimes, or even those convicted of capital crimes, because that court would never
know all of the facts of the vast majority of relevant cases-those in which the defendant
pled guilty to a lesser charge, those in which the prosecutor declined to pursue the death
penalty after conviction, or even those that proceeded to a sentencing trial but in which the
sentencer rejected the death penalty. One observer noted an aspect of this problem even
before the Georgia statute came before the United States Supreme Court. See Note, supra
note 29, at 1703. Later studies revealed that the Georgia Supreme Court's proportionality
review was unhelpful in ensuring consistency. See, e.g., George E. Dix, Appellate Review of the
Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEo. L.J. 97, 110-23 (1979). In reviewing a California death sen-
tence, the United States Supreme Court later confirmed that this kind of appellate review
was not required by the Eighth Amendment. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 49 (1984).
60. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 292-305 (1976) (plurality opinion).
61. Id. at 292-301.
62. Id. at 302-03.
63. In reviewing Georgia's discretionary statutes, the plurality took the opposite posi-
tion regarding the relevant group within which consistency was required, asserting that
Furman had only been concerned with arbitrariness among those convicted of capital
crimes. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 ("Furman, in contrast, dealt with the decision to impose the
death sentence on a specific individual who had been convicted of a capital offense.").
64. The theory by which the discretionary statutes would promote consistency outside
of the sentencing hearing had to be that prosecutors would usually pursue the death penalty
where one of the aggravating factors appeared to be present. However, there was no good
reason to assume such a position. Indeed, studies later established that, even after a capital
murder conviction, prosecutors subsequently declined to pursue the death penalty in a large
majority of cases. See BALDUS STUDY, supra note 12, at 327 (noting that in more than two-
thirds of the death-eligible cases, a life sentence was imposed by default because the prose-
cutor declined to pursue the death penalty after obtaining the murder conviction).
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precluded the sentencer from considering "the possibility of com-
passionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties
of humankind."65 This point implied that the Eighth Amendment
required an expansive sentencing inquiry that recognized each
offender's uniqueness, which collided with the notion that all of-
fenders, or some definable subset thereof, were equal. If the
sentencer had to be free, as the plurality required, to reject the
death penalty based on all "relevant facets of the character and re-
cord of the individual offender or the circumstances of the
particular offense, 66  consistency would seem thwarted, not
servedY.
The inability of the plurality in the 1976 Cases to explain the de-
cisions on consistency grounds-and the implausibility of
consistency as an Eighth Amendment value'8-reveals that the 1976
Cases were grounded on pragmatics more than on theory. First, the
plurality apparently wanted to uphold some of the sentencing
schemes to make it clear that the Court would allow the death
penalty to continue. On this view, the plurality was largely defer-
ring to the forceful manifestations of public and legislative support
for the death penalty in the wake of Furman.69 Second, the plurality
wanted to eliminate the mandatory statutes because they appeared
regressive and draconian. 7 These goals, rather than a theory of
consistency, seem to explain the plurality's holdings.
Pursuing these pragmatic goals produced a disconnection be-
tween the decisions and the consistency rationale. To dispel the
specter created by Furman that the Court would abolish the death
penalty, the plurality had to repudiate the notion that consistency
was highly valued. Rejecting abolition required rejecting the
65. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion).
66. Id.
67. A year after the 1976 Cases, in (Harry) Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per
curiam), the Court struck down a provision in the Louisiana mandatory death statute con-
cerning the murder of a police officer. Some dispute apparently remained within the Court
as to whether Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), had left open the question of
whether a mandatory death penalty under the police officer provision was permissible.
However, in a per curiam opinion joined by the five Justices who had voted to reverse in the
1976 case, the Court rejected a mandatory death penalty for such a crime. See (Harry) Roberts,
431 U.S. at 637. While the (Harry) Roberts Court left open the question of whether a manda-
tory death penalty could apply to an intentional murder by an inmate already serving a life
sentence without possibility of parole, the Court later rejected a mandatory death penalty
even for that tiny class of murderers in Sumnerv. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
68. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., ZIMRiNG & HAWKINS, supra note 28, at 66-67 ("Two phenomena appear to
have strongly influenced Justices Stewart and White: the impact of Furman on public opinion
and the legislative response to Furman.").
70. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 296 (plurality opinion) (noting the "incompatibility of
mandatory death penalties with contemporary values").
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notion that consistency was required because consistency could not
be achieved through regulation. However, the plurality did not
want to overrule Furman both because that course would concede
an enormous error and because the plurality opposed the manda-
tory statutes and needed a rationale to reject them. Arbitrariness
was the common concern expressed among the Justices supporting
the per curiam order in Furman, and the plurality understandably
chose to claim allegiance to that decision in supervising capital
sentencing.
C. The Early Refinements (1977-1980): Clarifying the
Narrowing and Individualization Requirements
In the four years after the 1976 Cases, the Court clarified the
mandates from those early decisions and confirmed that consis-
tency was not an important concern. The 1976 Cases had not
articulated precisely what rules defined an acceptable capital sen-
71tencing system. However, two basic requirements were implied .
First, the approval of the Georgia system, in light of the rejection of
the standardless Georgia scheme in Furman, suggested that aggra-
vating circumstances were needed to at least slightly narrow the
group subject to the death penalty. Second, the rejection of the
mandatory death penalties indicated that states must allow for a
sentencing hearing 72 at which the sentencer could reject the death
penalty based on mitigating evidence proffered concerning the
offender's character, record, or crime. Shortly after the 1976 Cases,
the Court endorsed these two mandates, although the Court still
seemed not to have settled on a coherent Eighth Amendment the-
ory to justify its regulatory regime.
The Court's effort in Godfrey v. Georgia7 to clarify the role of ag-
gravating circumstances paid lip-service to the consistency goal, but
demonstrated no serious commitment to that end. In Godfrey, the
Court struck down one of the ten aggravating circumstances in
Georgia's statutory list because, as applied by the Georgia Supreme
Court, the circumstance plausibly described every murder.4 In re-
71. See, e.g., Semeraro, supra note 12, at 87-88.
72. The 1976 Cases did not expressly resolve whether a state could satisfy the Eighth
Amendment through a unitary proceeding at which a fact-finder would resolve both the
guilt-or-innocence and the sentencing questions. However, since 1976, no state has passed
such legislation and, thus, the Court has had no occasion to address the question.
73. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
74. Id. at 429. The circumstance applied to an offense that "was outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an
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jecting it, the Court described the purpose of aggravating circum-
stances as "channeling" sentencer discretion and, thereby, implied
a desire for consistency.75 However, the Court knew that the aggra-
vating circumstances in the Georgia statute did not actually guide
the sentencer to a decision. 76 At most, they narrowed the group of
offenders subject to standardless decision-making. Even on that
score, the combined list of remaining aggravating circumstances in
the statute obviously covered the vast majority of all murders. Such
minimal system-wide narrowing failed to identify the very worst
homicides, which meant that the system did little if anything to
promote consistency. If consistency mattered, the Court should
have rejected the Georgia system altogether.
The Court's decision in Lockett v. Ohio7 reaffirmed and refined
the requirement of individualized consideration, and, in the proc-
ess, further demonstrated that consistency was not a principal
concern. In rejecting Ohio's special-question scheme as too man-
datory, the Court, through Chief Justice Burger, clarified that the
capital sentencer must remain free to reject the death penalty
based on "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death." Burger neither described the
substantive question or questions to which this evidence
aggravated battery to the victim." Id. at 422 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (7)
(1978)).
75. See, e.g., Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 429 ("The standardless and unchanneled imposition of
death sentences in the uncontrolled discretion of a basically uninstructed jury in this case
was in no way cured by the affirmance of those sentences by the Georgia Supreme Court.").
See also id. at 428 ("[I]f a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional
responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious
infliction of the death penalty.").
76. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
77. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
78. The statute required a death sentence unless,
considering the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, character,
and condition of the offender, one or more of the following [was] established by a
prepondence [sic] of the evidence:
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the
fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provoca-
tion.
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or
mental deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the
defense of insanity.
Id. at 612-13 (appendix to opinion of the Court) (citing OHio REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.04(B) (1975)).
79. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion).
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supposedly related nor explained why the Eighth Amendment
should mandate such a rule. He simply asserted that the rule would
help to protect against a death sentence that ignored "factors
which may call for a less severe penalty,,8° and that it was justified
by the "degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual.",
8
The Lockett mandate seemed to foreclose the use of any objective
guiding rules aimed at promoting consistency, given that any such
rule inevitably would prevent the use of certain kinds of mitigating
evidence to reject the death penalty.8 2 The Court's explanation for
the mandate also eschewed any commitment to consistency. The
idea that capital offenders were each unique collided with the no-
tion that they or some subgroup of them were equal.
These decisions, coming shortly after the 1976 Cases, only un-
derscored that the Court was never serious about consistency as a
goal for its capital sentencing regulation. The Court's early post-
Furman decisions revealed that a capital sentencing scheme need
only provide minimal narrowing83 and broad individualized con-
sideration to pass Eighth Amendment muster. Despite the Court's
rhetoric, neither of these two mandates tended to ensure "a mean-
ingful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which the death
penalty is imposed from the many in which it is not.
84
80. Id. at 605.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Sundby, supra, note 15, at 1161 ("[A]fter Lockett, one of the surest routes to
reversible error would be to guide the sentencer by listing mitigating factors that could be
considered without also making clear that the sentencer could consider any unlisted mitigat-
ing evidence bearing on the offender's culpability.").
Lockett raised concerns about the Texas statute, which the Court previously upheld inJurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Although the Texas statute allowed for consideration of a
broader array of mitigating evidence than the Ohio statute, it seemingly did not allow miti-
gation evidence showing a permanent disability, like mental retardation. Such evidence
might help explain why the offender had committed the crime although it would not estab-
lish that the offender had acted unintentionally. The Supreme Court later struck down the
statute as applied to a retarded offender in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), before it
held the death penalty categorically inapplicable to retarded offenders in Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
83. The Court's decision in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), helped clarify the
starting point from which narrowing was to occur. In Coker, the Court held that the death
penalty was categorically inapplicable to the rape of an adult woman in which no life was
taken. Id. at 597-98. The implication was that, except perhaps for certain extraordinary
crimes, the death penalty would only apply to murders.
84. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 313 (1972) (White,J., concurring)); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (quot-
ing Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring)). See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 301 (1987) (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White,J., concurring)).
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D. Enforcing the Early Principles (Beyond 1980):
Policing the Narrowing and Individualization Commands
Since 1980, the Court's regulation of capital sentencing under
the Eighth Amendment has centered on enforcing the minimal
narrowing and expansive individualization requirements that grew
out of the 1976 Cases. During the mid-1980s, the Court strongly
85
underscored its continuing disinterest in pursuing consistency.
The clearest indication was its decision in McCleskey v. Kemp,s6 which
involved the Court's rejection of a claim based on statistical evi-
dence that the Georgia system produced results influenced by
racial bias. 7 While generally seen by commentators as apostasy, 8
cases like McCleskey-and the Court's post-1980 cases in generals 9-
coincided with the early post-Furman decisions.
The narrowing mandate from Godfrey v. Georgia"' did not serve
any clear function, but, while it was never completely abandoned, it
was also never extended. Later decisions have followed Godfrey's
holding that a statutory aggravator effectively describing all mur-
ders is invalid.9l However, the Court has frequently upheld vague
85. The Court decided three cases in the 1983 term that initially were thought to re-
veal a retreat from the consistency goal but that now appear only as fairly predictable follow-
ups to the Court's repudiation of consistency beginning in 1976. The decisions came in Zant
v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), Barclay v. florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983), and Pulley v. Harris,
465 U.S. 37 (1984). The Zant case reaffirmed that Georgia's statute was constitutional al-
though the finding of an aggravating circumstance under the statute served no purpose
other than to narrow the group of defendants subjected to an entirely discretionary sentenc-
ing decision. Zant, 462 U.S. at 874. The Barclay decision confirmed Greggs transparent
conclusion that consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances was not constitu-
tionally prohibited. Barclay, 463 U.S. at 957-58. See also supra note 54 and accompanying text
(discussing Gregg). In Pulley, the Court repudiated some earlier rhetoric suggesting that a
system like that used in Georgia or Florida would require efforts by the state appellate courts
to measure and enforce consistency. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 54.
86. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
87. The Supreme Court rejected McCleskey's Equal Protection and Eighth Amend-
ment claims in a five to four decision. McCleskey, a black man, had been sentenced to death
for killing a white Atlanta police officer in the mid-1970s. Id. at 283. In arguing that race-of-
victim and race-of-defendant bias infected his case, he relied on a sophisticated study of
murder cases arising in Georgia between 1973 and 1979. Id. at 286.
88. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 14.
89. The decision in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988), further underscored that
consistency was not the Court's goal. The Court rejected a Louisiana petitioner's challenge
to the use of an aggravating factor that mirrored an element of capital murder. Id. at 241. A
seven-Justice majority held that there need be no narrowing at the sentencing phase if nar-
rowing occurs at the guilt-or-innocence stage through a narrowed definition of capital
murder. Id. at 246. The decisions in the 1976 Cases did not clearly foretell this conclusion,
but they strongly suggested it.
90. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). See also supra notes 74-75 and accompany-
ing text.
91. See, e.g., Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 46-52 (1992) (concluding that "especially
heinous, cruel or depraved" factor in Arizona statute was overly vague); Espinosa v. Florida,
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aggravating circumstances on grounds that the narrowing con-
structions given them by state courts have cured the ambiguity.
92
These decisions reveal that the Court will not require much speci-
ficity in the application of statutory aggravators." The Court has
also never required that states limit the application of their full list
of statutory aggravators, and some states have long lists that cover
almost all murders.94 The result is that capital sentencing systems
on the whole need only provide minimal, if any, narrowing,95 which
means that the Godfrey mandate does virtually nothing to promote
consistency.
At the same time, throughout the 1980s and beyond, the Court
repeatedly enforced the broad individualization rule. Despite the
Court's ruling in Lockett v. Ohio,6 states continued to prevent capi-
tal sentencers from relying on mitigating evidence to reject the
death penalty. However, in a lengthy series of decisions arising in a
variety of states, the Supreme Court continued to overturn death
sentences under Lockett. The decisions concerned evidence rele-
vant to various substantive questions, including the defendant's
culpability for the capital offense," good deeds unrelated to the
505 U.S. 1079, 1081-83 (1992) (per curiam) (finding that "especially wicked, evil, atrocious
and cruel" factor in Florida statute did not adequately narrow); Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S.
1, 4 (1990) (per curiam) (rejecting as inadequate judicial efforts by the Mississippi courts to
provide a narrowing construction for "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravator);
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364-65 (1988) (holding that Oklahoma's aggravating
factor of murder "especially, heinous, atrocious, or cruel" was too ill-defined).
92. See, e.g., Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 479 (1993) (upholding narrowing construc-
tion of "utter disregard" for human life); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 652-56 (1990)
(upholding narrowing construction of "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved").
93. Commentators have contended that the Supreme Court has at times been willing
to accept "narrowed" constructions that themselves lack sufficient specificity. See, e.g., Susan
Raeker-Jordan, A Pro-Death, Self-Fulfilling Constitutional Construct: The Supreme Court's Evolving
Standard of Decency for the Death Penalty, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 455, 501 (1996). Cf Rich-
ard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases-The
Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REv. 941 (1986) (arguing that the "especially heinous" ag-
gravators cannot satisfactorily be narrowed through judicial construction).
94. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 384 (asserting that the many special circum-
stances listed in the California statute do not, as a group, significantly reduce the number of
murderers subject to a possible death sentence).
95. See, e.g., Jordan M. Steiker, The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in Capital
Cases, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2590, 2619 (1996) ("Aggravating circumstances that purport to iden-
tify a narrowed category of especially deserving offenders in fact identify virtually the entire
class of offenders."); White, supra note 14, at 87 (asserting that "statutes that require the
prosecution to prove at least one aggravating circumstance" produce only "a marginal re-
duction" in the group subject to the death penalty).
96. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
97. See, e.g., McCoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 439-44 (1990) (rejecting require-
ment that jury find mitigating circumstances unanimously where defendant presented
mitigating evidence of emotional disturbance and youth); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S.
393, 397-99 (1987) (rejecting Florida practice of limiting mitigating factors to those on
statutory list because it precluded consideration of defendant's mental problems arising
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crime, 8 and future dangerousness.' The Court also concluded
that, where evidence could serve several mitigating functions, the
sentencer should be free to consider it for any of those purposes.100
The decisions culminated with Penry v. Lynaugh,"°" in which the
Court struck down the Texas statute that it originally had upheld in
1976 as applied to a mentally retarded offender.02 Recently, the
Court again rejected several death sentences imposed under the
original post-Furman Texas system, 0 3 concluding that the special
questions precluded the jury's use in mitigation of an offender's
proffered evidence. 04 These decisions reveal the Court's continuing
from sniffing gasoline as a youth and his upbringing in deprived circumstances); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112-13 (1982) (rejecting death sentence imposed by judge based
on a statute that precluded consideration of defendant's emotional disturbance and tumul-
tuous and violent upbringing).
98. See, e.g., Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 397-99 (implying that evidence that defendant was a
"fond and affectionate uncle" could not be precluded from consideration).
99. See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1986) (overturning death sen-
tence where sentencing judge had declined to consider evidence of defendant's well-
adjusted behavior in jail awaiting trial); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113 (holding that preclusion of
consideration of evidence of offender's rehabilitative potential violated Lockett rule).
100. See, e.g., Skipper, 476 U.S. at 7 (concluding that defendant's good behavior in jail
pending trial was relevant both to his good character and to his lack of future dangerous-
ness if sentenced to prison rather than to death).
101. Penryv.Lynaugh,492U.S.302 (1989).
102. Id. at 328 (concluding that the jury was not allowed an adequate opportunity un-
der the special questions in the statute to reject the death penalty based on Penry's
mitigating evidence of retardation and childhood abuse).
103. The Texas legislature amended the statute in 1991 to allow for the consideration of
all mitigating evidence. The current statute poses two questions that are similar to the first
two questions in the old statute and also requires the sentencer, before imposing a death
sentence, to answer negatively the following broad question:
Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the circumstances
of the offense, the defendant's character and background, and the personal moral
culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circum-
stances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole rather than a
death sentence be imposed.
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (2) (e) (Vernon 2006). For the text of the original
post-Furman statute, see supra note 43.
104. See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004) (reversing death sentence because the
statute prevented the jury from considering the defendant's evidence of relatively low intel-
ligence, among other factors, as a reason to reject the death penalty); Tennard v. Dretke,
542 U.S. 274 (2004) (reversing death sentence on grounds that evidence that the defendant
had an intelligence quotient of sixty-seven could not reasonably be considered by sentenc-
ing jury as a basis for rejecting the death penalty).
Between Penry and Tennard, the Court also upheld some death sentences under the old
Texas statute against claims that the sentencing jury could not consider the evidence as
required by the Lockett rule. In some cases, the Court simply decided that the jury could
appropriately consider the disputed evidence. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368
(1993) (concluding that evidence of defendant's youthful status at time of crime could be
adequately considered in mitigation under the special question concerning future
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support for expansive individualized consideration, which also fur-
ther underscores its disinterest in promoting consistency.
II. THE PURPORTED CONFLICT BETWEEN CONSISTENCY
AND INDIVIDUALIZED CONSIDERATION
Although the Court's Eighth Amendment doctrine on capital
sentencing has never required more than minimal single-
aggravator narrowing and individualized consideration of poten-
tially mitigating evidence, the Justices have often stated that it also
requires consistency, which has fostered confusion. Some of the
Justices have continued to urge that a tension exists in the deci-
sions between the goals of consistency and individualized
consideration. 5 They have cited this purported conflict as a reason
to allow restrictions on individualized consideration or, in some
cases, to pursue much more drastic reforms. Of course, these ar-
guments ignore that the Court was never serious after Furman
about pursuing consistency and that a consistency command has
no plausible grounding in the Eighth Amendment.
The idea that the doctrine embodies a conflict between consis-
tency and individualized consideration has come largely from
conservative Justices, whose goal has not been to achieve consis-
tency so much as to limit the doctrine of individualization.
Dissenting opinions by Justices White and Rehnquist in Lockett first
claimed that a conflict existed between Furman and Lockett.
1
0
6
dangerousness). In other cases, the Court concluded that the claim was not cognizable in
federal habeas corpus because the state court's ruling that the jury could have adequately
considered the evidence was not an unreasonable interpretation of then-existing federal law.
See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 475 (1993) (concerning claims regarding the de-
fendant's youth and history of childhood abuse).
105. See infra notes 106-120 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens has claimed that
there is no such tension because the narrowing function for identifying statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances operates at an eligibility stage to promote consistency while the
individualized consideration requirement operates at a subsequent stage where the sen-
tencer actually decides whether the offender should receive the death penalty. See, e.g.,
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 716-18 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although less ex-
plicitly, a majority of the Court has also hinted at this two-stage theory. See, e.g., McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 (1987) ("In contrast to the carefully defined standards that must
narrow a sentencer's discretion to impose the death sentence, the Constitution limits a State's
ability to narrow a sentencer's discretion to consider relevant evidence that might cause it to
decline to impose the death sentence."). See also CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 13, at 179-
80 (discussing Justice Stevens's view); Sundby, supra note 15, at 1161-64 (discussing the
Court's use of this two-stage theory). However, the narrowing requirement in stage one is
minimal and, thus, virtually useless as a way to promote consistency.
106. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 621, 622 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (contending
that, with its opinion in Lockett, "[t]he Court has now completed its about-face since
Furman"); id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Lockett rule "will not elimi-
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Nearly a decade later, Justice O'Connor also pointed to the pur-
ported conflict as a reason to limit the individualization
requirement.0 7 A conservative majority of the Court has also some-
times referenced the purported need to pursue consistency as a
secondary reason to reject an individualization claim.' 8
Some Justices have also cited the purported conflict as a reason
to abandon the individualization requirement altogether. In 1990,
in Walton v. Arizona, 109Justice Scalia first advocated this position. He
claimed that consistency was required by Furman,"° that broad in-
dividualized consideration was required by Woodson and Lockett,"'
and that the two goals were fundamentally incompatible. 2 He also
urged that the only acceptable way to resolve the conflict was to
rescind the requirement of individualized consideration, which he
nate arbitrariness or freakishness in the imposition of sentences, but will codify and institu-
tionalize it").
107. In California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987), the Court addressed whether an in-
struction against relying on "mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice,
public opinion or public feeling" improperly prevented the jurors from acting on the sym-
pathy they might have felt for Brown based on his mitigating evidence. Id. at 542. Justice
O'Connor joined the majority's opinion upholding the instruction's validity. At the same
time, she wrote a decisive concurrence. She noted that, on remand, the California court
could conclude that the trial judge had not adequately informed the jury of its obligation to
provide a "reasoned moral response" to the mitigating evidence. Id. at 544. However, she also
concluded that a capital sentencer should not be able to act on mere sympathy untethered
to mitigating evidence. Id. at 545. She justified this latter conclusion in part on the need to
balance the competing goals of achieving "non-discriminatory" results and allowing for
individualized consideration. Id. at 544 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,, 428 U.S. 153, 198
(1976)).
108. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993), is an example. Justice Kennedy, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas, rejected Johnson's conten-
tion that the original post-Furman statute in Texas did not allow his youth to be given
mitigating effect for what it said about his culpability. Id. at 370. However, Kennedy also
asserted that the Court was required to limit the individualization mandate to pursue the
competing requirement of guided discretion, which Gregg had justified as promoting consis-
tency. Id. at 373 ("The reconciliation of competing principles is the function of law. Our
capital sentencing jurisprudence seeks to reconcile two competing, and valid, principles in
Furman, which are to allow mitigating evidence to be considered and to guide the discretion
of the sentencer.").
109. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
110. See id. at 666 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (asserting
that the issue involved in Furman was whether society "may insist upon a rational scheme in
which all sentencers making the individualized determination apply the same standard").
111. See id. at 662 (asserting that, under the Woodson-Lockett line of cases, "a defendant
could not be sentenced to death unless the sentencer was convinced, by an unconstrained
and unguided evaluation of offender and offense, that death was the appropriate punish-
ment").
112. See id. at 666-67 (asserting that the individualization mandate undermines "consis-
tency and rationality among sentencing determinations" because it "permits sentencers to
accord different treatment, for whatever mitigating reasons they wish, not only to two differ-
ent murderers, but to two murderers whose crimes have been found to be of similar
gravity"); id. at 672-73 ("My... fundamental problem ... is not that Woodson and Lockett are
wrong, but that Woodson and Lockett are rationally irreconcilable with Furman.").
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suggested had no good Eighth Amendment explanation."3 Justice
Scalia has repeated these arguments on several occasions. ' 14 justice
Thomas has announced his agreement with Justice Scalia. "5
The reputed conflict has not been cited exclusively by Justices
advocating limits on individualization. One Justice who originally
supported the Court's decisions resanctioning capital punishment
after Furman subsequently noted the conflict as a reason to reject
all existing death penalty statutes. In an opinion dissenting from
the denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins,'1 6 one of his last opin-
ions before retiring from the Court, Justice Blackmun argued that
both consistency and individualized consideration were required
by the Court's prior decisions. Like Justice Scalia, he contended
that consistency was required by Furman'7 and that individualized
consideration was required by Woodson and Lockett."" He also
agreed with Justice Scalia that the two goals were incompatible. 9
However, unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Blackmun concluded that
the solution was to strike down all existing death statutes.1
2
0
Much scholarly commentary also has accepted the existence of
the dual goals. The prevailing view remains that the Court was se-
rious about pursuing consistency after Furman. 21 There is also a
widespread view that the Court's larger struggle after Furman was
over how to accommodate efforts to pursue consistency with efforts
to ensure individualized consideration. 2 2 Of course, the Court has
113. See id. at 673 ("Since I cannot possibly be guided by what seem to me incompatible
principles, I must reject the one that is plainly in error.").
114. See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 49 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Tennard v.
Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 293-94 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting);Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,
373 (1993) (Scalia,J., concurring).
115. See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 487-88 (1993) (Thomas,J., concurring)
(asserting "disagreement with the Court's prohibition" of "mandatory sentencing schemes").
Cf Tennard, 542 U.S. at 294-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting petitioner's claim that the
Texas statute allowed inadequate consideration of his low intelligence in part because the
contradiction in the doctrine justified restricting the requirement of individualized consid-
eration). See also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 382.
116. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994).
117. See, e.g., id. at 1147-49 (Blackmun,J., dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari).
118. Id. at 1150-51.
119. Id. at 1155 ("All efforts to strike an appropriate balance between these conflicting
constitutional commands are futile because there is a heightened need for both in the ad-
ministration of death.").
120. Justice Blackmun explicitly concluded that the death penalty was unconstitutional
as currently administered. Id. at 1158-59 ("Because I no longer can state with any confi-
dence that this Court is able to reconcile the Eighth Amendment's competing constitutional
commands, . .. I believe that the death penalty, as currently administered, is unconstitu-
tional."). However, he also stated that he did not believe that any statute could reconcile the
purportedly competing goals, which meant that he favored abolition. Id. at 1145.
121. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 12.
122. See, e.g., Hoeffel, supra note 12, at 786 ("[A] standard claim of critics of the Court's
administration of the death penalty is that Furman's Eighth Amendment command, which is
[VOL. 40:3
SPRING 2007] Furman I Mythical Mandate
failed to achieve consistency.23s However, there has been little
scholarly dissent from the view so often expressed by the Justices
that consistency is an Eighth Amendment objective.2
4
The difficulty with all of these arguments is that the purported
conflict between consistency and individualized consideration is
fictional. 25 Questions have arisen about how far the Court will go
in requiring individualized consideration.2 6 However, those ques-
tions have not implicated a genuine concern with balancing
individualization against consistency. Consistency is not a valid
Eighth Amendment aspiration.2 7 Moreover, the Court abandoned
125
any serious effort to pursue consistency in the 1976 Cases.
Justice Scalia has also revealed that he knows that the doctrine
does not value consistency. If he were correct that the Woodson and
Lockett decisions violated a principle of consistency compelled by
the Eighth Amendment, every existing death penalty statute
should be unconstitutional." All existing statues allow for expan-
sive individualized consideration of mitigating circumstances and,
thus, could not provide consistency, according to Justice Scalia's
argument. However, he has made clear that he would not, on this
account, support a requirement that states channel the capital
sentencer's mitigating discretion."s He would view any argument
described as a command for standardization and consistency, is in irreconcilable conflict
with the Woodson/Lockett v. Ohio Eighth Amendment command to individualize the sentenc-
ing decision to the characteristics of the individual offenders." (footnote omitted));
Semeraro, supra note 12, at 83 (noting that not only the Court but commentators as well
have generally viewed the doctrine "as a tool to reduce arbitrariness and provide an indi-
vidualized inquiry" and, when so viewed, the doctrine "appears to be riddled with
inconsistency and mystery").
123. See infra text accompanying notes 170-172 and 192-196.
124. But see Hoeffel, supra note 12, at 787 (asserting that the concurring Justices in
Furman ultimately were more concerned with "arbitrariness in an individual case" than with
"arbitrariness between cases" and, thus, "consistency was not, and has not been, the Court's
end goal").
125. 1 have elsewhere argued that the capital sentencing cases embody a conflict, but
not one between consistency and individualized consideration. The inconsistency is between
the mandate of individualized consideration and the Court's failure to limit the capital sen-
tencing inquiry in accordance with the best Eighth Amendment explanation for that
mandate. See Howe, supra note 20, at 417 (contending that the requirement of individual-
ized consideration means that "[tihe capital sentencing inquiry should be directed in a way
that aims to ensure that the sentencer renders judgments about offender deserts"). See also
infra Part III.C.
126. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
128. See supra Part I.B.
129. See Sundby, supra note 15, at 1189 ("If Locketfs mitigation scheme violates Furman,
the immediate effect, of course, would be to invalidate all existing death penalty schemes,
since they have been legislatively or judicially modified to meet Lockett's requirements.").
130. In Johnson v. Texas, Justice Scalia stated:
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that current statutes should be struck down for failing to channel
mitigating discretion as an unacceptable extension of current doc-
trine.'" This position undermines his very claim that the doctrine
values consistency.
Recognizing that the Court in 1976 uncoupled capital sentenc-
ing regulation from an equality command resolves arguments
based on the alleged conflict. Minimal narrowing and expansive
individualized consideration are the only Eighth Amendment re-
quirements that the Court has imposed on capital sentencing
trials. Because consistency is not required, the purported conflict is
imaginary.
III. ASSESSING THE DOCTRINE UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Questions remain about the legitimacy of the Court's capital
sentencing doctrine. Rejecting the consistency explanation leaves
unanswered the question of whether the doctrine has a constitu-
tional rationale. 32 However, this Part demonstrates that the
doctrine can find explanation in the Eighth Amendment. The
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment limits the use of
the death penalty to those persons who deserve death. 3 If under-
stood as a middle ground between deregulation and abolition, a
theory of regulation based on this principle can explain and im-
prove the doctrine.
In my view the Lockett-Eddings principle that the sentencer must be allowed to con-
sider "all relevant mitigating evidence" is quite incompatible with the Furman
principle that the sentencer's discretion must be channeled. That will continue to be
true unless and until the sort of "channeling" of mitigating discretion that Texas has
engaged in here is not merely permitted ... but positively required-a further elabora-
tion of our intricate Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that I neither look forward to
nor would support.
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 373-74 (1993) (Scalia,J., concurring) (citation omitted).
131. See id.
132. The prevailing scholarly view is that the doctrine lacks legitimacy because it fails to
achieve consistency. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
133. I have presented this theory previously. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 6, at 829-31;
Howe, supra note 11, at 2139-41.
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A. A Deserts-Limitation as an Eighth Amendment
Restriction on the Use of the Death Penalty
The deserts-limitation builds on the idea that the Eighth
Amendment proscribes disproportional punishments as well as
punishments deemed altogether inhumane. Those who conclude
on originalist grounds that the prohibition is only against certain
inhumane modes of punishment do not endorse the dispropor-
tionality doctrine, and several recent or current Justices have
sometimes advocated this restrictive construction. 134 However, the
"modes only" view is vigorously disputed on historical 135 and other
grounds. 13 6 For nearly a century, a majority of the Court has consis-
tently rejected it.17 The Court has repeatedly endorsed the
134. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991) (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J.) ("[T]he Clause disables the Legislature from authorizing particular forms
or 'modes' of punishment."); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 488 (1983) (Thomas, J., con-
curring) ("[T]he better view is that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was
intended to place only substantive limitations on punishments ... ."). See also RAOUL BER-
GER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 44-49 (1982) (asserting
that the Framers only intended to proscribe certain barbarous punishments and that the
death penalty was not among them).
135. See, e.g., Laurence Clausen, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV.J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 119, 136 (2004) (asserting that the clause was meant to prohibit certain in-
stances of invidious discrimination, in particular, efforts "to single out an offender on a
morally insufficient basis for more punishment than was customarily imposed"); Anthony F.
Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv.
839, 839-42 (1969) (asserting that the drafters and early jurists probably understood the
clause as prohibiting only certain modes of punishment, but contending that, as used in the
English Bill of Rights, from which it derived, the clause was understood only to prohibit
excessive punishments); Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up The Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 475, 510, 507-519 (2005) (contending that an originalist inquiry, rather than
supporting Justice Scalia's view, reveals "that the ban was meant to outlaw punishments that,
while permissible in some circumstances, are disproportionate for the offense and the of-
fender at hand"). See also Phillip E. Johnson, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 575, 575 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (suggesting
that attempts to assess the clause's original meaning have been inconclusive).
136. The propriety of the orginalist enterprise itself is, of course, disputed, but that is-
sue is beyond the scope of this Article. The question has produced a vast literature. For
some prominent recent commentary on the subject, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A QUESTION OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 17 (1997) (arguing for an originalist ap-
proach focusing on "objectified" intent or, in other words, on original understanding). Cf
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY 30 (2002) (con-
tending thatJustice Scalia's approach has been "a failure on its own terms," because "[i]t has
been no more successful than other methods in purging judicial decisionmaking of value
judgments" and has presented "deeply contradictory strains").
137. In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), the Court first struck down a pun-
ishment as excessive in relation to the crime. For embezzling a small sum of money, Weems
was sentenced to twelve years of hard labor, a loss of civil rights, and perpetual supervision.
The Court struck down the penalty as cruel and unusual on the grounds that the punish-
ment was too severe for the offense. Id. at 366-67.
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proportionality concept in the non-capital contextL' 3 More impor-
tantly, the Court has used the proportionality notion to impose
categorical restrictions on the use of the death penalty.' 9 These
categorical decisions have rested on a conclusion that the death
penalty in the relevant context is undeserved," a measure that
comports with our basic sense ofjustice. '4
This deserts-limitation theory can help explain not only the
Court's categorical restrictions on the death penalty, but also the
need for an individualized assessment of potentially mitigating evi-
dence concerning the offender's character, record, and crime.
Even after excluding those defendants protected by the Court's
categorical rulings, the level of deserts of those who have commit-
ted murder ranges widely."" Doctrines regarding felony-murder
and vicarious liability bring within the murder category many per-
sons whose involvement in the crime is minor. The mental and
emotional states of even those who are highly involved in a murder
also vary greatly. Allowing a convicted murderer at a separate sen-
tencing hearing to present all of the evidence bearing on his
deserts that a jury might rationally use to reject the death penalty
138. See, &g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997 (KennedyJ.,joined by O'Connor and SouterJj.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (endorsing a "narrow proportionality
principle" for non-capital cases); id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Blackman, J.
and Stevens, J.) (asserting that "any punishment that is grossly disproportionate" to the
defendant's offense violates the clause); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (overturning as
cruel and unusual punishment a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole
under state habitual offender law after conviction for fraudulently passing a bad check for
$100.00).
139. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (rejecting the death penalty for re-
tarded offenders); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (rejecting the death penalty for
inmates who are insane); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(prohibiting the death penalty for "rape not involving the taking of life"); Eberheart v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (per curiam) (holding the death penalty per se inapplicable
for kidnapping and rape where no life is taken).
140. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-19 (concluding that retarded offenders generally lack
the "personal culpability" to justify a death sentence); Coker, 433 U.S. at 598 (plurality opin-
ion) (contending that, while rape greatly harms serious personal interests, those interests
were not equal to life itself). See alsoJosHuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 57
(3rd ed. 2001) (asserting that, in the plurality opinion in Coker, "Justice White applied a
strictly retributive conception of proportionality").
141. See, eg., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 45
(1976) ("Ask the person on the street why a wrongdoer should be punished, and he is likely
to say that he 'deserves' it.");John Hospers, Retribution: The Ethics of Punishment, in ASSESSING
THE CRIMINAL 181, 183 (Randy E. Barnett &John Hagel IH eds., 1977) ("'[Tlreatment in
accord with desert' is probably the most frequently encountered definition of the term Jus-
tice' itself.").
142. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 373 ("[D]eath-eligibility remains re-
markably broad--indeed, nearly as broad as under the expansive statutes characteristic of
the pre-Furnan era.").
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could help ensure that only those who deserve the death penalty
receive that sanction.1
43
The deserts-limitation theory also prevails by default over a utili-
tarian-based explanation for the doctrine. A theory that focuses on
utilitarian concerns cannot rationalize the need for an expansive
sentencing inquiry as a prerequisite to every death sentence. Some
utilitarian questions, such as the need for incapacitation of a capi-
tal murderer, might benefit from individualized sentencing
inquiries.14 However, several utilitarian justifications, such as the
potential for deterrence of other potential murderers or resource
efficiency, call for categorical rather than case-by-case adjudica-
tion."45 The Court seemingly could not ignore these latter
utilitarian rationales for eliminating the sentencing inquiry unless
utilitarian rationales in general were not part of the Eighth
Amendment explanation for mandating the inquiry. The Eighth
Amendment's language does not seem to forbid some of the utili-
tarian justifications for punishment but permit the others. 46
As an explanation for regulating capital sentencing trials, the
deserts-limitation theory more satisfactorily coincides with the lan-
guage of the Eighth Amendment than does the consistency
theory.17  The theory provides the substantive measure for
143. See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 15, at 1178 (asserting that the Court's broad definition
of potentially mitigating evidence in Lockett is "tied to the ultimate issue of whether the de-
fendant deserves the death penalty").
144. To determine whether a capital offender would likely commit future acts of vio-
lence if not executed, a sentencer would appropriately consider the particularities of the
capital crime along with details about the offender's background and character. See, e.g.,
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269 (1976) (noting that the post-Furman Texas statute included
a capital-sentencing inquiry focused in part on whether the defendant would commit future
acts of criminal violence).
145. A legislature could determine, for example, that the execution of all who are con-
victed of certain aggravated crimes, objectively defined, would provide the greatest societal
benefit in crime reduction taking account of the costs involved. If this utilitarian question
were all that mattered, there would be no apparent reason for a sentencing inquiry. It would
make little sense to require repeated determinations by individual capital sentencers about
whether the legislature was correct, particularly given that resolution of the question would
not turn on the facts of the particular cases before them. Cf Herbert L. Packer, Making the
Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1071, 1079 (1964) (noting that, if general deter-
rence of crime were the only consideration, "it becomes difficult if not impossible to
impeach the rationality of legislation [favoring] the death penalty in a particular category of
offenses").
146. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 20, at 341-42 (rejecting utilitarian theories as an expla-
nation for individualized consideration).
147. An undeserved death penalty is plausibly understood to violate the language of the
Amendment. "Since Furman, an average of about 300 of the approximately 21,000 homi-
cides committed in the United States each year have resulted in a death sentence." James S.
Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 2030, 2052 (2000). The small abso-
lute and proportional numbers of death sentences even for homicide indicate that the
punishment is unusual. Further, imposing an undeserved death sentence is especially
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determining when a death sentence is cruel and unusual that the
consistency theory ignores. Unlike the consistency theory, the
deserts-limitation also defines who may not receive the death pen-
alty without also demanding that all who deserve death receive that
sanction. The theory does not claim equality in the distribution of
death sentences as an Eighth Amendment mandate and, therefore,
is not undermined by evidence that many who deserve the death
penalty are spared.
1 49
The deserts-limitation theory, much more than the consistency
theory, also rationalizes the Court's actual doctrine regulating capi-
tal sentencing trials. The consistency theory cannot explain why
the Court would regulate the capital sentencing phase while allow-
ing decision makers at other stages nearly unfettered discretion to
reprieve murderers from the death sanction. Pursuing consistency
at the sentencing phase makes little sense except as part of a larger
effort to secure consistency in the overall selection process. In con-
trast, the deserts-limitation theory claims only that no offender
should receive the death penalty if it is not deserved. Rules regulat-
ing the capital sentencing hearing could help ensure this result
even if decision makers at other stages of the selection process re-
tain largely unregulated discretion to confer reprieves.
B. Using the Deserts-Limitation as a Principle for Regulating Capital
Sentencing: The Difficulty of Defining and Measuring Deserts
While the deserts-limitation theory is more plausible than any
other Eighth Amendment theory for regulating capital sentencing
trials, it also poses problems. The Supreme Court lacks the ability
to manage the capital sentencing inquiry to ensure good desert
assessments because the Court cannot define in detail when an of-
fender deserves the death penalty.1 50 From a deregulatory
unusual, and, certainly, can be thought cruel. See, e.g., Stacy, supra note 135, at 531, 550
(reading "the Eighth Amendment as prohibiting punishments that are not reasonably re-
garded as justly deserved" and asserting that "death is a proportionate punishment only if it
is imposed on the ... subcategory of murderers who deserve the harshest punishment as a
matter ofjustice").
148. See sources cited supra note 6.
149. The theory, thus, corresponds with what one commentator has observed about the
Court's regulatory efforts: "[T]he Court has had only one primary goal for its regulation of
capital punishment: decreasing overinclusion ... ." David McCord, Judging the Effectiveness of
the Supreme Court's Death Penalty Jurisprudence According to the Court's Own Goals: Mild Success or
MajorDisaster?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 545, 548 (1997).
150. The ultimately moral nature of the question makes precision about how it should
be assessed unrealistic and, some commentators suggest, unamenable to the rule of law. See,
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perspective, this problem implies that the Court should have
avoided doctrines governing capital sentencing trials and relied
instead on a few categorical rules defining death eligibility. The
Court should not have tried to specify the rules of capital sentenc-
ing if the societal consensus about deserts did not allow the Justices
to be specific. 5 ' At the other end of the spectrum, from a defen-
dant-oriented perspective, the inability of the Court to define
deserts with precision means that regulation was doomed to fall
short of the goal of protecting against undeserved death sen-
tences.' 5 This claim, which differs from a claim alleging mere
inconsistency, implies that the Court should have abolished the
death penalty. 53 On either of these views, the deserts-limitation fails
as a basis for regulating capital sentencing trials. However, when
understood as a compromise between these polar positions, the
theory succeeds as a regulatory rationale.
1. The Argument for Deregulation
The argument against the use of the Eighth Amendment to
regulate the capital sentencing trial rests on the proposition that
the Court should interpret the Amendment in accordance with
societal values. The Court has long asserted that the protection
against cruel and unusual punishments embodies the "'evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety. '" 5 4 While anathema to those who believe that the clause
should apply as it would have originally,5 5 this view also connotes
that the Court should not get ahead of the societal consensus. The
Court has purported to follow this view in addressing claims for
categorical restrictions on the death penalty. The Justices have
e.g., Semeraro, supra note 12, at 107 ("[T]here are certain decisions that are so intertwined
with moral questions that decision-making according to the rule of law is unacceptable.").
151. See Howe, supra note 6, at 835-43 (explaining the argument that the Court's inabil-
ity to define deserts with any precision favors, on prudential grounds, not attempting to
regulate capital sentencing trials under the Eighth Amendment).
152. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 11, at 2106-23 (summarizing numerous studies from
various states indicating that race heavily influences the distribution of death sentences).
153. See generally id. at 2138-64 (setting out the Eighth Amendment argument for aboli-
tion based on the inability to appropriately determine which offenders deserve death).
154. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
155. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundations of Originalism: An Account and
Critique, 71 B.U. L. REv. 1, 10 (1991) (asserting that this view would "make an originalist's
skin crawl").
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disagreed on the methods for identifying societal consensus.156
Nonetheless, a successful showing has generally included objective
evidence, such as, for the relevant category, that a majority of state
legislatures do not authorize the death penalty and that, in most
other states, capital sentencers usually do not impose the sanc-tion.157
The principal problem for the Court in using the deserts-
limitation to regulate capital sentencing trials is the absence of any
apparent agreement about how to measure deserts. 15 While a so-
cietal consensus surely exists that only the deserving should receive
the death penalty, the agreement does not proceed "all the way
down" 59 to specific rules about how to determine deserts. The
Court has avoided the difficulty of clarifying the rules by merely
holding that the capital sentencer must be free to reject the death
penalty based on any evidence proffered concerning the offender's
character, record, or crime. 10 This approach effectively allows each
sentencing jury to decide for itself what substantive rules should
control.161
156. See, e.g., CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 13, at 62-63 (noting that there is dis-
agreement among the Justices about how to determine "the views of contemporary society"
regarding the appropriate application of the death penalty).
157. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594-98 (1977) (plurality opinion) (cate-
gorically rejecting the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman, noting that only
Georgia continued to allow the death penalty for such a crime and that Georgia juries only
imposed the death penalty in about ten percent of rape cases). See also Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002) (outlawing the imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded of-
fenders, after noting, among other evidence, that more than half of the states did not
permit the death penalty in such cases and that this majority position reflected a strong
recent trend); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (striking down the death penalty for
accomplices who neither intended to, attempted to, nor actually killed and noting that the
vast majority of states did not provide for the death penalty in such cases).
158. Some commentators have questioned whether a sentencer can ever accurately as-
sess the level of deserved punishment of a criminal offender. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT,
THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY 318 (1998) ("Any effort to do so will confront very serious
problems of knowledge, interest, and power."); WALTER KAUFMANN, WITHOUT GUILT AND
JUSTICE 64 (1973) ("Not only is it impossible to measure desert with the sort of precision on
which many believers in retributive justice staked their case, but the whole concept of a
man's desert is confused and untenable.").
159. ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 225 (1974).
As one commentator has noted, "[t]he moral judgment that the sentencer must make is
... a profoundly personal one." Laura S. Underkuffler, Agentic and Conscientic Decisions in
Law: Death and Other Cases, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1713, 1725 (1999). This assertion implies
that there is no societal consensus to which the sentencer is seeking to conform. See id.
"[T]he members of the jury are not to determine, on some agentic basis, what the moral
judgment of the community would be. Rather, the community's conscience in these cases is
expressed through the exercise of conscience by each individual juror." Id.
160. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (plurality opinion).
161. Under the Court's approach, some jurors may give secondary consideration to the
deserts question and focus instead on a utilitarian issue to impose a death sentence. See id.
For example, a juror could decide that a defendant should be executed because he would
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The problem is that, even if all jurors intuitively focused on of-
fender deserts, they probably would not agree on how to assess
deserts. It is unclear, for example, whether jurors should focus only
on the offender's culpability for the capital crime or, instead, on a
broader assessment of the offender's "general deserts" based on all
of his life works. If the inquiry is only about culpability, details of
the crime and the offender's role in it, along with any explanations
based on his background or character that suggest his reduced
moral blameworthiness, would be relevant. I1 2 However, if the in-
quiry focuses on his general deserts, the jury could also consider,
for example, the offender's crimes or acts of valor independent of
the capital offense.
1 63
Assuming the Court was to require a focus on culpability, which
is the more specific of these desert measures, major definitional
problems would remain. Philosophers and criminal law theorists
do not agree on how to define when a person becomes morally
responsible for a crime.1 4 They certainly would not agree on when
a partial excuse should mitigate the punishment. When should no-
tions of determinism prevail over notions of free will to excuse an
offender altogether? In cases where notions of free will prevail,
when can causes external to the offender's responsible self, such as
childhood abuse or an accidental brain injury, still render a
subsequent crime somewhat forgivable? Philosophers and criminal
present a great danger to others if given a prison term rather than a death sentence. Like-
wise, a juror could decide that the defendant should be executed to deter other potential
murderers. Such a decision could often coincide with a determination by the juror that the
offender does not deserve the death penalty, perhaps because some mental or emotional
disability beyond the offender's control helped to explain his violence. The Court's deci-
sions do not prevent a prosecutor from arguing for the death penalty on these utilitarian
grounds. See infra notes 221-223 and accompanying text. Nor do they require that jurors be
instructed to focus only on the question of offender deserts. See infra notes 208-213 and
accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that a focus on culpability would involve an evaluation of the facts of the crime and
the defendant's involvement along with an assessment of the defendant's history and charac-
ter to the degree that they imply that the crime was "attributable to a disadvantaged
background, or to emotional and mental problems").
163. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 6, at 836-38 (noting that there is no apparent agreement
about which measure of deserts ought to determine the sentence in capital cases).
164. Philosophers have debated for centuries whether notions of free will and deter-
minism are sufficiently compatible to support a theory for determining the moral
blameworthiness for human actions. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HU-
MAN UNDERSTANDING 99-105 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1894); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 250
(Francis McDonald Cornford trans., New York: Legal Classics Library special ed. 1945);
SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, 152-58 (Marcus Dods trans., New York, Modern Li-
brary 1950). Voluminous discussion'has continued about this problem in modern times. See
generally DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE (Sydney Hook ed.,
1958); FREE WILL (Gary Watson ed., 1982); MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (John Martin Fischer
ed., 1986).
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law theorists provide widely varying answers to these kinds of ques-
tions. 65 Given these disagreements, there are no grounds to claim a
societal consensus.
An effort to determine deserts must also confront the uncer-
tainty and disagreements about the relative degree to which the
death penalty punishes the offender. Some murderers may suffer
much more greatly than others from a sentence of life imprison-
ment, and some offenders may suffer much more greatly than
others from the anticipation of execution. Yet, there is no consen-
sus about how to make these determinations in individual cases.166
It is also unknown what suffering, if any, comes after death. In-
deed, some have argued that a death sentence is sometimes less
• • 167
punishment than life imprisonment. These uncertainties and
disagreements further complicate the argument that widespread
agreement exists about how to judge the deserts of capital murder-
ers.
Given the doubts about the existence of a societal consensus, or
at least the Supreme Court's ability to identify it, the Justices ar-
guably should defer to each state legislature. Unless the Court can
explain in fairly specific terms why a legislative judgment on how to
judge capital murderers is improper, the Court arguably should
not interfere. The Court certainly lacks a compelling basis to turn
the question over to various juries, using whatever standards their
particular members prefer.
1 68
2. The Argument for Abolition
The countervailing argument for abolition emphasizes that the
inability to clarify appropriate rules for judging deserts inevitably
will result in improper impositions of the death penalty. Because
165. See generally Scott W. Howe, Reassessing the Individualization Mandate in Capital Sen-
tencing: Darrow's Defense of Leopold and Loeb, 79 IowA L. REV. 989, 1012-36 (1994) (explaining
the disagreements among philosophers and criminal-law theorists about the answers to such
questions).
166. See, e.g., John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 CAL. L. REV. 59, 89 (1987) (stating that
there is "dissensus" among judges and jurors about how to value the retribution involved
with prison and death).
167. See, e.g., Jacques Barzun, In Favor of Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY 154, 161-63 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 1964) (asserting that a life
prison sentence generally causes more suffering than a death sentence); Douglas Mossman,
The Psychiatrist and Execution Competency: Fording Murky Ethical Waters, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
1, 58 n.231 (1992) (questioning whether execution is necessarily more punitive than life
imprisonment).
168. I have developed the argument for deregulation more extensively elsewhere. See
generally Howe, supra note 6.
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capital sentencers often will not determine deserts appropriately,
they will not ensure that only persons who deserve death receive
that sanction. Consequently, the criminal justice system is not able
to fulfill the promise of the Eighth Amendment. On this view, the
sanction should be abolished.16 9
Evidence that the justice system cannot adequately protect
against undeserved death sentences comes from numerous studies
indicating that race strongly influences the outcomes in capital
cases.' 7, Studies conducted in a variety of states reveal that a defen-
dant is much more likely to receive the death penalty for the
murder of a white victim than for an identical murder of a black
victim.1 7' Many studies have also found that, among those who kill
whites in seemingly identical circumstances, black defendants are
more likely to receive the death penalty than white defendants.1
72
The race of the victim or of the defendant does not itself bear on
the deserts of the offender.173 Therefore, these studies strongly sug-
gest that some offenders who receive the death penalty do not
deserve that sanction, even though those individual cases cannot
be identified with much certainty.
The Supreme Court is also unable to remedy racial bias in capi-
tal selection through regulation. Commentators have suggested
various strategies that the Court might follow to promote equality
in capital selection. These proposals include imposing more de-
manding procedural requirements in capital cases, mandating the
reintroduction of mandatory death sentencing, requiring a nar-
rowing in the use of the death penalty to certain highly aggravated
murders, and reversing all death sentences in certain categories in
which statistical evidence demonstrates a reasonable probability
that race has influenced outcomes. 7 4 However, all of these strate-
gies pose serious problems that make them implausible as ways to
eliminate racial discrimination. Some of the proposals, particularly
169. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due
Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1184 (1980) ("The issue is really whether we can
accord due respect to any defendant sentenced to death in the context of a system that we
know must wrongly kill some of them although we do not know which." (citation omitted)).
170. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the
Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, With Recent Findings From Philadelphia, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 1638 app. B at 1742-45 (1998) (providing a summary of information
concerning various states in which empirical studies have found race-of-victim or race-of-
defendant discrimination in capital cases).
171. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 11, at 2106-23 (summarizing many of the studies).
172. See id.
173. See Sundby, supra note 15, at 1178 ("Certainly, no reasonable person would argue
that invidious factors like race or poverty ... properly bear on whether the defendant de-
serves death.").
174. SeeHowe, supra note 11, at 2123 (compiling these theories).
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those focused on procedural reform or mandatory death penalties,
would likely be ineffective.'75 Other proposals, particularly those
focused on forced narrowing, would remedy the disparities only by
miring the federal courts in an administrative morass while also
nearly thwarting the use of the death penalty.176 Still other propos-
als, especially some of those requiring states to produce racial
neutrality according to statistical measures, assume a level of cen-
tralized state control over capital sentencing that is unrealistic or
unconstitutional.7 7 These problems imply that there is no workable
solution to the problem.7
Abolishing the death penalty based on evidence of racial dis-
crimination would require the Court to ignore the majoritarian
175. Some scholars have asserted that procedural reforms could promote equal out-
comes for equally situated defendants. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 421-25.
However, most of the prominent proposals have centered on such problems as the convic-
tion-prone nature of capital sentencing juries, the poor quality of defense counsel, and the
haphazard opportunities for merits review in habeas appeals. See Howe, supra note 11, at
2124. These reforms would safeguard against certain forms of inequality. However, they
appear unlikely to reduce racial discrimination in capital selection except to the extent that
they thwart the use of the death penalty generally. See id. at 2124-27. Proposed safeguards to
confront racial bias directly, such as by requiring jurors to certify that racial prejudice has
not influenced their verdict, also appears hopelessly ineffectual. Id. at 2126-27.
176. The idea of forced narrowing assumes that the federal courts would require juris-
dictions to so substantially narrow the group of death-eligible offenders that prosecutors and
jurors would almost always favor the death penalty in the resulting narrowed category of
offenders, rendering race irrelevant. This notion builds on suggestions by Justice Stevens
about the way that states might attack inequality in capital selection. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 367 (1987) (StevensJ., dissenting). The overriding problem with this theory is the
inability of the federal courts, without effectively abolishing or nearly abolishing the use of
the death penalty, to identify with objective standards the category of aggravated capital
cases in which racial bias would not operate. See Howe, supra note 11, at 2129-32.
177. Proposals for the United States Supreme Court to simply mandate near-zero dis-
parity levels, as revealed by statistical evidence, contemplate that states would discover their
own ways to eliminate racial disparities and, if not, that the federal courts would invalidate
their death selection systems. See id. at 2132. However, states have insufficient control over
local prosecutors and individual sentencers to increase the level of death sentences in black-
victim cases, where the death-sentencing rates are low. See id. at 2132-33. Moreover, assum-
ing states could overcome those practical problems to achieve "leveling up," any such efforts
at racial engineering in this context would likely violate the Equal Protection Clause. See id.
at 2134-36. Of course, the federal courts could simply require that states pursue strategies
for eliminating racial disparities through reducing the use of the death penalty in general.
However, because of the high level of litigation that would recur over the statistical method-
ologies and proof, this approach would still greatly burden the federal judiciary and likely
result in the de facto elimination or near elimination of the death penalty. See generally id. at
2136-38.
178. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 14, at 158 (asserting that "some of the forces that create
racism in capital sentencing are simply too powerful to be swept away by procedural tinker-
ing" and that "abandoning the death penalty entirely" is the only solution to the racial
discrimination problem). See also Kurt S. Scheidegger, Capital Punishment in 1987: The Puzzle
Nears Completion, 15 W. ST. U. L. REv. 95, 124 (1987) (asserting that racial prejudice as an
influence on the criminal justice system is not likely to disappear "within the foreseeable
future").
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view favoring perpetuation of the sanction.Y19 Widespread legisla-
tive support for capital punishment and its occasional imposition
imply that there is no societal consensus against its use in aggra-
vated murder cases.18° However, relying on the societal consensus
test to uphold the use of the sanction ignores the discrimination
problem. Evidence that a majority supports the use of the sanction
arguably should not determine its constitutionality if racial preju-
dice inevitably taints its use. The Court could instead focus directly
on the problem and ask if there is a workable remedy. On grounds
that there is no solution-meaning that undeserved death sen-
tences inevitably will issue-the Court could abolish the sanction
under the Eighth Amendment.
Understanding the racial disparities as a violation of the deserts-
limitation undermines a central argument of retentionists about
why the Eighth Amendment cannot require abolition." Retention-
ists have emphasized that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
contain language that contemplates the use of the death penalty,
indicating that the Eighth Amendment was not originally under-
stood to prohibit the sanction."2 However, this point arguably
focuses too heavily on the specific application rather than the gen-
179. Public support for the death penalty remains strong, with approximately two in
three Americans favoring the death penalty. See Charles Lane, Changing Attitudes About the
Death Penalty, WASH. POST,Jan. 2, 2006, at All ("[D]espite recent slippage, public sentiment
in favor of capital punishment remains strong: 69 percent in the 2005 Gallup poll supported
the death penalty for murder.").
180. The death penalty is available as a penalty for certain aggravated crimes in more
than two-thirds of American jurisdictions. For a listing of state death-penalty statutes in 2004,
see Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Crimes Punishable by the Death Penalty, http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=144&scid=10 (on file with The University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). For information regarding the number of death sen-
tences issued in recent years, see Death Penalty Information Center, Death Sentences by Year
1977-2004, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=9&did=873 (last visited Jan.
31, 2007) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
181. Retentionists have also emphasized that racial inconsistency does not undermine
the propriety of deserved death sentences. See, e.g., COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 7, at
198 (noting that death penalty supporters contend that society's interest in retribution
trumps concerns about racial inequality). However, this argument incorrectly assumes that
the problem revealed by the racial disparities is mere inconsistency among those who de-
serve the death penalty. Once the capital sentencing hearing is understood as an effort
mandated by the Eighth Amendment to determine who deserves death, evidence that race
influences the outcomes suggests that some who are sentenced to death do not deserve that
sanction. See Howe, supra note 11, at 2146-47.
182. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, 213-14 (1990) (asserting that
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provided protections against the use of the death
penalty and "thus clearly showed that the death penalty itself was constitutionally accept-
able" (citation omitted)); Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 4, 34 (1987) (contending that the death penalty does not violate the
Eighth Amendment in part because the penalty is contemplated by language in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments).
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eral understanding of the prohibition. If the clause is understood
to prohibit the death penalty when it is not deserved, the modern
death penalty can be stricken down as violating the deserts-
limitation despite the sanction's use at the time of the founding
because it was then thought deserved for various crimes. 83 The Su-
preme Court repeatedly has concluded that the Eighth
Amendment now requires that the capital offender be free to try to
persuade the jury that he does not deserve the death penalty, al-
though mandatory death sentences were allowed at the time of the
founding. 8 4 This change has come about because contemporary
society no longer believes that a murderer automatically deserves
death, although the contrary view prevailed when the Eighth
Amendment was promulgated.' S5 Statistical evidence of the racial
discrimination problem provides additional new information that,
despite efforts to assess deserts, the judicial system is frequently
unable to determine deserts accurately. Consequently, the modern
system for imposing the death penalty can be seen as inevitably vio-
lative of the Eighth Amendment.
8 6
Striking down the death penalty on these grounds would not
pose any serious problems for sentencing in non-capital cases. Re-
tentionists have noted that racial discrimination seems to influence
the imposition of prison sentences in non-capital cases and, there-
fore, to abolish the death penalty on grounds of racial bias would
logically require abolishing prison sentences as well. " 7 However,
the Court could easily distinguish the death penalty from other
punishments and sensibly limit a conclusion based on statistical
183. The same kind of reasoning has been used by originalists to endorse the decision
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), although the Fourteenth Amendment
was not originally understood to require integration of public institutions. See, e.g., BORK,
supra note 182, at 81-82 (asserting that Brown can be grounded on an originalist interpreta-
tion if the Fourteenth Amendment is understood as requiring only a general principle of
equality rather than the specific understanding of equality that was held when the amend-
ment was promulgated).
184. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976) ("At the time the
Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791, the States uniformly followed the common-law
practice of making death the exclusive and mandatory sentence for certain specified of-
fenses." (citation omitted)).
185. See, e.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 13-16
(2002) (noting the prevailing view in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that capital
punishment was just retribution for serious crimes).
186. See, e.g., SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 154 (asserting that the death penalty
could infringe the "general prohibition" in the Eighth Amendment although that view did
not prevail at the time the Eighth Amendment became law).
187. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314-15 (1987) (asserting that
McCleskey's claim based on evidence of racial discrimination in the Georgia capital selec-
tion system "taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that
underlie our entire criminal justice system").
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evidence of racial discrimination to the capital sentencing context.
The Court has frequently emphasized that death as a sanction is
unique due to its severity and finality and because of the trouble-
some moral questions that it raises.'88 The Court has used this
distinction to explain several differences in the procedural protec-
tions afforded to capital as opposed to non-capital defendants.'89
Most importantly, the difference explains why a more demanding
proportionality rule applies in capital cases than in non-capital
cases." This special effort to ensure that only deserving offenders
receive the death penalty also can explain why racial discrimina-
tion that may be tolerated in the non-capital context is intolerable
in the capital context.'
Evidence of racial discrimination is likely only the most visible
part of a much larger problem with undeserved death sentences.
Many improper considerations besides race probably also influ-
ence decisions to impose death. For example, prosecutors and
capital sentencers may sympathize more with victims and defen-
dants who they find physically appealing than with those they find
ugly 92 and favor those who are from their own community more
than those who are outsiders. 9 "We value the life most of those we
are most like.""' In addition, fact-finders all too frequently convict
innocent persons of capital murder and compound the error by
sentencing them to death.195 The frequency of exonerations from
death row in recent years raises a sobering question about the
188. See, e.g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (noting the uniqueness of
the death penalty both from the point of view of the defendant and society); Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (same).
189. This distinction also explains, for example, why individualized consideration is es-
sential in capital cases but not in other criminal contexts. See, e.g., Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (noting that "[d]eath, in its finality,
differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a
year or two" and, consequently, that there is need for heightened reliability in a death pen-
alty case).
190. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991).
191. 1 have elsewhere addressed additional claims that retentionists offer about why the
Eighth Amendment should not be understood to prohibit the death penalty even assuming
that unconscious racial discrimination influences some decisions to impose death. See Howe,
supra note 11, at 2150-64.
192. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 317 (1987).
193. See, e.g., Interview with Alan M. Dershowitz, Professor at Harvard Law School, in
Cambridge, Ma. (Mar. 2, 1988), in A PUNISHMENT IN SEARCH OF A CRIME 330, 331 (Ian Gray
& Moira Stanley eds., 1989).
194. See id.
195. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003,
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 529 (2005) (noting that, between 1989 and 2003, sev-
enty-four persons sentenced to death in the United States were exonerated).
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number of executions of innocents. 96 These concerns further un-
dermine confidence that decision makers will always determine
deserts appropriately. The general inability of our capital selection
systems to ensure deserved death sentences, beyond racial dis-
crimination alone, warrants abolition under the Eighth
Amendment.
3. Pursuing the Deserts-Limitation Theory as a Compromise
Between Deregulation and Abolition
The case for regulating capital sentencing trials under the
Eighth Amendment is best understood as a compromise between
arguments for deregulation and abolition. The mandated capital-
sentencing hearing allows the defense to present all of the poten-
tially mitigating evidence that bears on the offender's deserts with
the hope that jurors will impose a death sentence only where the
offender deserves that sanction. The inability of the Court to de-
fine for jurors how to determine deserts raises troubling questions
about the legitimacy of the effort. Nonetheless, arguments for de-
regulation or abolition also pose problems.
The argument for deregulation does not account for the possi-
bility that some states will impose mandatory or near mandatory
capital sentencing schemes. In response to Furman, for example,
many death penalty states enacted mandatory death statutes, 197 re-
flecting an approach to capital sentencing that had been
abandoned throughout the country during the previous century.
19 8
This legislation was surely an effort to respond to Furman, and,
while perhaps no jurisdiction would impose such an approach if
the Court deregulated capital sentencing today, we cannot be sure.
To favor deregulation is to say that the Court should eschew any
effort to address .such an occurrence, a position that is made espe-
cially difficult by the repeated decisions of the Court to require
expansive individualized consideration throughout the last thirty
199
years.
The argument for abolition under the Eighth Amendment rests
on a value judgment with which many may disagree. Statistical
196. See id. at 552 ("If we managed to identify and release 75% of innocent death-row
inmates before they were put to death, then we also executed twenty-five innocent defen-
dants from 1989 through 2003.").
197. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
198. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 292-301 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(discussing the trend away from mandatory death penalties toward discretionary systems
that began in the 1830s).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 96-104.
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studies implying racial bias in capital selection,0  while suggesting
that some of the death sentences that issue are undeserved, do not
clarify the proportion2 01 and certainly do not resolve whether the
number of undeserved death sentences is unbearably high.Y Con-
sequently, the argument for abolition must build on an assumption
that even a low level of undeserved death sentences is intolerable.
However, the majority of the public is not persuaded that the death
penalty is administered so unfairly as to warrant abolition. Popular
support for the death penalty remains strong, apparently
grounded heavily on the widespread belief that the vast majority of
murderers who receive the death penalty deserve that sanction.04
Vigorous public endorsement of the penalty may make it difficult
for the Justices to endorse a conclusion that it is too often unde-
served °.
The Court's capital sentencing doctrine represents a way of me-
diating between deregulation and abolition.06 As is the nature of
200. Some have resisted the conclusion that the studies reveal racial bias. See, e.g.,
McCleskey v. Zant, 580 E Supp. 338, 379 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (rejecting the evidence embodied
in the Baldus study as proof of racial discrimination in the Georgia system on grounds that
the data was flawed and the statistical methods unreliable); Stanley Rothman & Stephen
Powers, Execution by Quota?, PUB. INT., Summer 1994, at 3, 8 ("On the basis of the available
research, one simply cannot conclude that racial discrepancies are a function of racism.").
201. For example, some would contend that the statistical evidence may only show that
unwarranted reprieves are granted disproportionately to certain groups and, on that view,
that those who receive the death penalty still deserve it. See, e.g., Scheidegger, supra note 178,
at 125-26 (asserting that the disproportionately low number of death sentences in black-
victim cases may result from reduced pressure on prosecutors from the black community to
pursue the death penalty in such cases). Abolitionists would argue that this view implausibly
assumes that race influences decisions to grant mercy and other non-desert bases for re-
prieves but not decisions about deserts. They would urge as more intuitive that race
influences deserts decisions themselves and taints not only some decisions to reprieve but
also some decisions to condemn. See also supra note 181 and accompanying text.
202. See CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 13, at 252 (noting that former congressman
Bill McCullom has even concluded that "executing the innocent is an acceptable trade-off
for the public's increased sense of security").
203. See supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Little, supra note 7, at 1597 ("The fact is, in the minds of many Americans,
black or white, extremely aggravated killings simply cry out for a morally equivalent pen-
alty."); Scott Turow, To Kill or Not to Kill, NEw YORKER, Jan. 6, 2003, at 43 (noting that an
Illinois Commission appointed to recommend reforms of the state's capital punishment
system heard from supporters of capital punishment "one argument again and again: some-
times a crime is so horrible that killing its perpetrator is the only just response").
205. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 428 ("[T]he center [of the Court] has
been reluctant to adhere to Furman's reforming commitments in a manner that would place
,totally unrealistic conditions' on the use of the death penalty." (quoting McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987).
206. See Burt, supra note 14, at 1778 ("By insisting [in 1976] thatjuries must have discre-
tion to impose or withhold death sentences, Stewart reopened-but also buried-the
controversy. Stewart's essential mission thus was to dampen and obscure social conflict by
appeasing both proponents and opponents of capital punishment.").
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compromises, the effort is not entirely satisfying; it both denies
state legislatures significant latitude in guiding capital sentencer
discretion and fails, as the racial discrimination studies reveal, to
prevent undeserved death sentences. However, the doctrine can
still be understood as an imperfect effort to ensure that only those
who deserve the death penalty receive that sanction.
C. Arguments Based on Deserts-Limitation
for Improving the Doctrine
While existing capital sentencing regulation can find grounding
in an Eighth Amendment theory, the Court could also improve the
doctrine. The continuing lack of guidance to the jury about the
desert-oriented focus of the inquiry is at odds with the goal of pro-
tecting against undeserved death sentences. °7 Reforms that aim to
focus the jury on finding deserts as a prerequisite to a death sen-
tence could improve the process.
Capital sentencers should be told that the central issue that they
are to resolve before imposing a death sentence is whether the of-
fender deserves that punishment. Few capital sentencing systems
provide this information. 8 Under the Georgia scheme, for exam-
ple, sentencing jurors are essentially only instructed that they must
find at least one aggravating circumstance from a statutory list be-
fore imposing a death sentence.2 °9 They receive no meaningful
guidance about how to reach the verdict.210 Jurors in Florida are
given more instructions concerning possible mitigating circum-
stances that they may balance against aggravating evidence in
deciding the ultimate question. 21' However, they are not told how
to weigh any particular factor or what overriding question should
207. See Howe, supra note 20, at 417 ("The capital sentencing inquiry should be di-
rected in a way that aims to ensure that the sentencer renders judgments about offender
deserts.").
208. The current Texas statute includes a broad special question that asks the jury to
consider, inter alia, the "personal moral culpability" of the offender in deciding whether
"there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of
life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed." TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 37.071(2) (e) (Vernon 2006). This question arguably does not sufficiently clarify that a
finding of deserts must precede a death sentence. However, it at least explicitly focuses the
jurors on deserts, which is exceptional among existing capital sentencing statutes.
209. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
210. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 871 (1983) (noting that "[tihere is an absolute
discretion in the factfinder" to decide whether to impose death after the finding of a single
statutory aggravating circumstance).
211. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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determine their decision. Consequently, some sentencers may
choose to impose the death penalty on utilitarian grounds-for
example, to deter other potential murderers or to incapacitate a
seemingly dangerous offender. Particularly where the offender's
dangerousness appears high, but his culpability reduced, as with
certain physiologically or psychologically impaired murderers, the
decision makers may not focus on what retributive punishment the
offender deserves.
A requirement that a jury find, as a prerequisite to a death sen-
tence, that the offender deserves that sanction should replace the
current requirement that each aggravating circumstance slightly
narrow the group of capital offenders subject to execution. The
contours of the current narrowing requirement, which the Court
has held can be satisfied at either the guilt-or-innocence or capitalsentecing . ,214
sentencing trial, lack a convincing Eighth Amendment explana-
tion.2 5 Requiring, instead, that the capital sentencing jury find that
the offender deserves a death sentence directly addresses the cru-
cial Eighth Amendment concern.
If a state legislature opts to continue requiring sentencers to de-
termine the existence of aggravating circumstances at the capital
sentencing trial as an aid in resolving the deserts inquiry, restric-
tions should apply. First, a meaningful narrowing requirement 
16
should control. The deserts-limitation theory for regulating capital
sentencing trials contemplates that not every defendant convicted
of a capital murder deserves the death penalty.2 1 7 On this view, ei-
ther a single aggravating circumstance or a list of such
circumstances that is reasonably thought to apply to every murder
or even most murders may mislead a sentencing jury. Such a
scheme will fail to narrow the group to those more deserving of
the death penalty and may imply at the final stage of decision-
making that any given offender deserves that sanction. A meaning-
ful narrowing mandate would prevent this potential for skewing
the jury towards a death verdict.
212. See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 95, at 2618 ("For the comparison of aggravating and
mitigating factors to be meaningful, the decisionmaker must be informed of the moral ques-
tion or questions that the factors are intended to help answer.").
213. See id. ("Indeed, the most aggravated crimes are likely to be the very ones in which
the defendant has some identifiable limitations which render him less culpable.").
214. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 51-59, 73-76, and 90-95.
216. See supra notes 51-55, 73-74 and 90-91 and accompanying text.
217. See Stacy, supra note 135, at 550 ("One feature of prevailing practice that may be re-
lied upon as having constitutional significance is the widely shared judgment that not every
murderer deserves death.").
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Statutory aggravating circumstances that focus only on utilitar-
ian concerns also should be prohibited. For example, in Oklahoma
and Virginia, a statutory aggravating circumstance asks whether the
offender probably presents a danger of further criminal violence.1 8
This kind of factor rests on an incapacitation rationale and has the
particularly detrimental effect of turning mitigating evidence into
aggravating evidence. Many capital offenders have disabilities that
arguably reduce their culpability, but also increase their future
dangerousness." 9 Consequently, an aggravating circumstance fo-
cused on future danger not only fails to narrow the group to the
more deserving, but also may greatly increase the odds at the final
stage of decision-making that capital sentencers will impose a
death sentence on persons who do not deserve that sanction.
Moreover, any aggravating circumstance that finds its explanation
in utilitarian theory may also at least modestly increase the danger
of an undeserved death sentence. °
Regardless of whether a state continues to articulate statutory
aggravating circumstances, prosecutors should generally not pre-
sent capital sentencers with utilitarian evidence or arguments to
justify death sentences. Under current practice, prosecutors can
present evidence on utilitarian concerns, such as expert testimony
from mental health professionals that the offender presents a high
218. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(7) (West 2006) (listing as an aggravating cir-
cumstance "[t]he existence of a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society"); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
264.2 (2006) (listing as an aggravating factor "a probability that the defendant would com-
mit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society").
See also Russel Dean Covey, Exorcizing Wechsler's Ghost: The Influence of the Model Penal Code on
Death Penalty SentencingJurisprudence, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 216-17 (2004) (discuss-
ing the widespread use of "future dangerousness" as an aggravating factor and the tendency
of prosecutors to urge the offender's dangerousness).
219. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 14, at 86 (quoting death penalty expert Craig Haney's
comments that "people who commit extraordinary crimes have extraordinary backgrounds,"
which, of course, also suggests that they will act violently in the future).
220. Legislation in most death penalty states lists aggravating circumstances that appear
to rest primarily on utilitarian rationales. "For example, under nearly every state death pen-
alty statute, the fact that the victim was a police officer is identified as an aggravating
circumstance." WHITE, supra note 14, at 104. Defining an aggravating circumstance as the
status of the victim as a police officer rather than, for example, a nun or a disabled person,
could be viewed by many jurors as an effort at deterrence. "Presumably, the legislature's
basis for making the victim's status as a police officer an aggravating circumstance is the
belief that there is a special need to deter homicidal attacks on police officers." Id. Perhaps
such a circumstance could be aggravating based on a retributive ground. However, given the
danger that the jurors would see the rationale as utilitarian, such a circumstance should not
be allowed, unless through instructions, the trial judge clarifies thatjurors should consider it
only for what it reveals, if anything, about the offender's enhanced culpability.
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risk of future danger.2 2 ' Likewise, prosecutors can urge a death sen-
tence to incapacitate a seemingly dangerous offender or to send a
message to others who may contemplate murder.Y Such deter-
rence arguments are common.2 2 3 In an open-ended system like that
used in almost all death penalty states, this could mislead the jury
into imposing a death sentence without finding that the offender
deserves that punishment. Consequently, this kind of evidence or
argument should be proscribed except in a "special-question" sys-
tem in which the utilitarian question is presented separately from
the question of deserts224 or in an open-ended system where the
defense has urged a reprieve on utilitarian grounds.
Requiring these new protections could cause some disruptions
in the use of the sanction, but they do notjustify inaction. First, the
Court has recently shown itself willing to reverse course on capital-
sentencing procedures even in the face of some disruptions. In
Ring v. Arizona, the Court overturned long-standing precedent that
it had repeatedly reaffirmed by holding that a jury must determine
the existence of the aggravating circumstance that makes a mur-
derer death-eligible.2 5 When the Court decided Ring, judges had
served as sentencers and had determined the presence of aggravat-
ing circumstances in nine death penalty jurisdictions. 6 Moreover,
221. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (rejecting challenge alleging that
expert witnesses in capital-sentencing proceedings are incapable of reliably predicting fu-
ture danger).
222. One commentator has noted:
[The prosecutor] may argue in favor of the death penalty in general, premising his
argument on a penological theory like deterrence or retribution. Or he may emphasize
that the death penalty is an especially appropriate punishment for the particular de-
fendant before the jury. Frequently, these two themes will be mixed together and
presented to the jury with the aid of colorful metaphors and strong emotional ap-
peals.
WHITE, supra note 14, at 113 (emphasis added).
223. See id. at 115-17 (discussing some common arguments relating to incapacitation
and general deterrence used by prosecutors in Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming, and
noting the permissive standards used by appellate courts in reviewing them).
224. Under the unusual special-question system currently employed in Texas, issues re-
garding future danger and offender culpability appear in separate questions. The ostensible
effect of this approach is to prevent a death sentence without findings of both future danger
and offender culpability, among others. Under the deserts-limitation theory, the Eighth
Amendment should not require states to allow reprieves on non-desert grounds. For defen-
dants who deserve death, the death penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment. But see
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1986) (holding that a capital offender is entitled
to have his sentencer be free to reject the death penalty based on evidence of good behavior
in jail while awaiting trial as an indication that he would not pose a future danger if sen-
tenced to life imprisonment).
225. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
226. Id. at 608 n.6.
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while these new protections would affect more states than the
mandate in Ring, they would still not affect most existing death
sentences. Under the law governing federal habeas corpus peti-
tions, federal courts cannot overturn a conviction or sentence from
a state court based on new Supreme Court decisions. Conse
quenly, states would not have to reconsider death sentences that
had become final on direct appeal.
These further efforts by the Court to ensure a deserts finding as
a prerequisite to a death sentence are warranted despite the
Court's inability to define the sentencing inquiry precisely.228 The
true inconsistency in the capital sentencing cases arises from the
Court's failure on the one hand to impose more desert-oriented
controls and its determination on the other hand to require broad
individualized consideration.229 The Court has not done all that it
can to ensure that each death sentence is deserved . Yet, the indi-
vidualized sentencing requirement finds Eighth Amendment
explanation only in a deserts-limitation theory on the use of the
death penalty.
V. CONCLUSION
The prevailing story about capital sentencing doctrine builds on
the notion that Furman v. Georgia revealed a regulatory principle of
nonarbitrariness or consistency in the use of the death penalty that
the Supreme Court has struggled to fulfill. According to the ac-
count, which the Justices themselves have fueled, the post-Furman
Court sought to ensure that death selection systems provided "a
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the
227. A state court decision is not reviewable on the merits in federal habeas unless it is
"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). See
also Melissa M. Berry, Seeking Clarity in the Federal Habeas Fog: Determining What Constitutes
"Clearly Established" Law under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 54 CATH. U. L.
REv. 747, 761 (2005) (providing information on the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1)). See
also Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective Assistance of Capital Postconviction
Counsel: Constitutional Implications of Statutory Grants of Capital Counsel 2003 Wis. L. REv. 31,
46-67 (discussing the 1996 legislation limiting federal habeas review of state court deci-
sions).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 158-163.
229. See Howe, supra note 20, at 401 ("[N]o member of the Court has ever acknowl-
edged the inconsistency of requiring individualized capital sentencing while approving
sentencing statutes that fall to require sentencer judgments about offender deserts.").
230. For an argument that the Constitution demands substantially more than this Arti-
cle has proposed to ensure that a jury's death verdict rests on proper grounds, see Hoeffel,
supra note 12, at 820-23 (making the case for allowing post-trial interviews of and testimony
by capital sentencing jurors to determine if they relied on improper considerations).
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penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not. 2 3 ' This
nonarbitrariness goal has gone unrealized. 32 The prevailing expla-
nation is that the post-Furman Court originally pursued
consistency, but then backed away after also becoming committed
to the competing goal of individualized sentencing consideration.
The consensus also remains, however, that consistency in the use of
the death penalty is a legitimate Eighth Amendment aspiration.33
A very different story about capital sentencing should prevail,
one that uncouples Furman's mythical mandate from the doctrine.
Nonarbitrariness or consistency in the use of capital punishment is
not itself a legitimate Eighth Amendment objective. If an offender
deserves death, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ments should not require that he be treated equally with other
offenders who deserve that punishment but are spared.3 4 Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court was never actually committed to
consistency after Furman, except in its rhetoric. From the begin-
ning of the post-Furman era, the Court rejected statutory selection
systems that sought to promote consistency, at least among those
convicted of capital crimes, while it upheld others that did virtually
nothing to achieve even that end.
The Court's continuing rhetorical focus on consistency as a goal
of regulation, moreover, has diverted attention from the important
questions to be asked about the doctrine.2 35 The Justices have fre-
quently been caught up with the notion that the doctrine reflects a
problematic tension between the goal of consistency and the goal
of individualized consideration of potentially mitigating evi-
dence.3 6 Scholars as well have often accepted the existence of this
conflict as the central problem in the Court's effort to regulate
capital sentencing trials. None of this is accurate. The predomi-
nant Eighth Amendment rule for capital sentencing from the very
beginning of the Court's post-Furman regulatory efforts has been
the mandate of individualized consideration. Consequently, the
important questions to ask about the doctrine stem from the
Eighth Amendment explanation for this individualization man-
date.
231. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 188 (1976)) (alteration in original). See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 301
(1987) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (White,J, concurring)).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 170-173 and 192-196.
233. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
235. See supra Part II.
236. See id.
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The Eighth Amendment principle that can justify individualized
capital sentencing and against which the Court's regulatory efforts
should be assessed is a deserts-limitation.237 The protection against
cruel and unusual punishments limits the use of the death penalty
to those persons who deserve that sanction. Much of the existing
regulation can be understood as pursuing this goal. There are
plausible arguments against the regulatory effort, some favoring
deregulation and others favoring abolition of capital punishment.
There are also good arguments that the Court's regulation could
be improved. However, all claims about the role of the Eighth
Amendment in limiting the use of the death penalty should recog-
nize that the goal is to protect against retributive excess, not to
ensure equality.
237. See supra Part III.
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